WEBVTT

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Hi, folks,

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we got a lot to talk about.

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Claude's source code was leaked.

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LinkedIn scrapes your browser extensions.

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There's a horribly insecure messenger app

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going around and more.

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All this and more coming up this week

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in on this week in privacy number forty

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seven.

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So stay tuned.

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Welcome back to This Week in Privacy,

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our weekly series where we discuss the

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latest updates with what we're working on

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in the PrivacyGuides community and this

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week's top stories in data privacy and

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cybersecurity.

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I am Nate,

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and joining me again this week is Jonah.

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How was your week, Jonah?

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You know, my week has been pretty good,

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thanks for asking.

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Besides misspeaking during the intro

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there.

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Can't complain.

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A lot of these things happen, right?

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Yes, yes.

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All righty.

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Yeah.

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I guess with that,

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we'll jump right into our headline story

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this week.

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And you guys have probably heard about

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this one.

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So there's an AI called Claude,

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Claude Code specifically,

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because there's a few different kinds of

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Claude.

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I'm not a heavy AI user myself,

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so I've heard that Claude is one of

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the better ones in terms of the results

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it puts out are mostly accurate.

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It puts out mostly good code.

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That's just what I've heard.

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You could do a lot worse than that

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one,

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but we're not going to talk about that.

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We're here to talk about the fact that

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Claude code had its source code leaked

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thanks to some human error.

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To clarify,

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this is the source code for the app

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itself, the Cloud Code CLI,

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not like the models or anything like that.

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But it still gives us a little bit

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of insight into what's going on under the

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hood.

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And...

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I guess I'll go over it a little

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bit, but I'm also mostly going to,

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I mean, we're a privacy podcast, right?

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So we're going to focus mostly on the

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privacy and security stuff.

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But just to kind of give you a

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little bit of a recap.

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So this happened because when they

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published the newest version of the NPM

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package, there was a source map file,

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which I'll be honest,

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that's technical stuff that goes over my

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head.

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But basically it allowed clever people who

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noticed it

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to access the source code.

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Like we said,

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it was almost two thousand TypeScript

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files and more than five hundred and

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twelve thousand lines of code.

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I saw somebody else round up to five

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hundred and thirteen thousand.

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So, yeah.

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I mean,

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it's one of those once the cat's out

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of the bag things, right?

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Or once the horse has left the barn.

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Because everybody quickly went and

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downloaded this,

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and there's other repos are springing up,

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which we'll talk about that in a second.

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Anthropic tried to get some of them taken

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down with a DMCA takedown,

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a copyright thing, basically.

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unrelated we're not going to talk about it

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but you know there was a whole uh

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like github interpreted that dmca

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according to the the official story github

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interpreted that dmca a little harshly and

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took down even things that were not

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supposed to be taken down but yeah it's

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it's been a whole thing um

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So I've also seen some pretty polarizing

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takes here because I think it was this

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article.

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Yeah,

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this article said that its sophistication

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is, quote, both inspiring and humbling,

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according to some people who looked at the

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code.

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I saw some people on Mastodon look at

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the code and say that it was pretty

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sloppy and kind of shocking that it was

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so bad.

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But I mean, to be fair,

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Mastodon tends to be a pretty anti-AI

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crowd.

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So I don't know who's telling the truth

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there, but.

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Yeah.

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So, and then real quick,

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before I jump into an analysis part,

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we have like a follow-up to this story

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that's related that says,

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Clawed code leak used to push InfoStealer

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malware on GitHub.

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And this one comes from Bleeping Computer.

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Basically, once the leak was out there,

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a lot of people started...

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putting up their own GitHub repos where

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they would advertise that this was cloud

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code with all the paywalled stuff removed,

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basically.

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So free premium cloud code.

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And they would game the SEO to make

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sure that it would show up in the

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front.

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If y'all are watching the video,

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you can see here,

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this one outlined in red is like the

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third result from the top on Google.

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And this is one of the malicious ones

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that the article focused on.

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And yeah, turns out, shocker,

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it includes an InfoStealer malware.

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I'm going to go out on a limb.

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The article didn't say this,

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but I'm going to go out on a

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limb and say that it did work once

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you fired it up.

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Because usually that's how it is, right?

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It works,

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so you don't think anything's wrong.

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But when you install it,

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it's actually got that InfoStealer in

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there.

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And they said that there were multiple

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repos like this.

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So...

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yeah so um cyber security takeaways from

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this the we're covering this as a headline

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story partially because this is a really

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big story going around right but there's

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there's a couple reminders here um one of

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them is as far as the uh the

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repo thing goes you know we we always

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talk about making sure you get things from

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an official source and um not not to

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go too far out of my way to

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pick on google here not like they don't

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deserve it but uh you know we've been

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covering a lot this whole google side

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loading story and you know google

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is trying to act like, oh,

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this is all for security, right?

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It's dangerous to get apps from a

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third-party store,

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even though the Play Store has plenty of

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malware on its own.

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But even so,

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the point being is get things from a

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trusted source.

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Signal, for example, does have an APK,

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but it's kind of hard to find.

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But it is okay to get it from

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the Play Store because that's a trusted

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source.

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Um,

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there's also other places that you could

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get the APK directly.

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There's third party app stores like F

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droid,

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which I know have some concerns about

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them.

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But the point being is like,

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this is when I go to download something,

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typically what I do is I go straight

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to the developer's website and I go, okay,

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what are their official channels?

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And then they'll say, you know, it's,

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it's on the play store.

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It's on F droid.

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It's on GitHub directly.

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And then I'll look at the list and

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decide which one I want to use.

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It's not so much the channel it's making

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sure it's, it's official.

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Um,

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So maybe don't try to get free Claude

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doing that.

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And then, yeah,

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just the other takeaway I had was the

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whole source code leak thing.

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Anthropic was really quick to own up that

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it was a human error.

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They said here, what was it?

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Yeah,

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this was a release packaging issue caused

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by human error, not a security breach.

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Yeah,

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not like AI doesn't do this kind of

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stuff all the time.

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But, you know,

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it's just remembering that there is...

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remembering the human element in

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everything.

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You know,

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if you listen to any social engineering

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people,

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they're always quick to point out that

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humans tend to be the weakest link in

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any system.

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You know,

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I could spend a lot of time trying

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to,

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if I'm trying to get into a building,

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right?

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I could spend a lot of time trying

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to hack the door code or the card

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readers or whatever,

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Or I could come up with a really

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convincing story for why I need to be

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there,

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usually involving a high-vis vest and a

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clipboard, in my opinion.

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But yeah,

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so I think those are kind of the

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more technical things that I took away.

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Jonah,

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was there anything specific about this

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story that jumped out to you from your

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expertise?

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yeah there were a couple things that i

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noticed and i was trying to find a

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tweet that i saw from somebody else but

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i couldn't pull it up here um but

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i'll talk about some stuff going back to

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what you said about mastodon i do think

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it's interesting um

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like the supposed quality or sloppiness of

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the code,

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because I believe Anthropic has said for a

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while that all of their code base is

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now AI-generated by all of their

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developers.

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That does, I think,

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at least bring into question whether you

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can DMCA or copyright any of this code

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at all.

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Maybe you can't because it's all

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AI-generated,

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which AI companies have been pretty firm

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about saying, you know, this is not...

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like a copyright concern at all.

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So it's kind of a taste of their

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own medicine there that all of this is

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out, I think.

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The main thing that I think we see

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in this source code,

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because like you said,

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the models aren't leaked,

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but there is a lot of information about

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the

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system prompts that Claude uses for a lot

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of different tasks,

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which definitely gives a lot of insight

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into how Claude works and how like,

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it like to to their competitors,

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I think it gives a lot of insight,

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like how you could make a similar product

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and also

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to people who are trying to do prompt

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injections to bypass some of the

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restrictions in placing cloud code,

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you can more easily see how they're

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implemented and get around them.

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So I don't know how people are going

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to end up using that,

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but I think that there is a lot

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of opportunity for people to do something

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with it.

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All of the AI stuff, I mean,

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we've talked about it on the show before,

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not...

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the most interesting to me from a security

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or privacy standpoint,

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because like cloud code and all of these

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AI models,

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they're going to run fully in the cloud.

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So they get all of this information.

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I think it is sort of dangerous to

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be using and relying on,

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especially for sensitive information.

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And that hasn't changed from any of this.

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But yeah, it's interesting stuff.

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The tweet that I was trying to pull

00:09:26.597 --> 00:09:31.558
up talked about how Claude and how

00:09:31.678 --> 00:09:36.480
Anthropic is using their AI to contribute

00:09:36.840 --> 00:09:38.759
security patches to a lot of different

00:09:38.840 --> 00:09:39.720
open source projects.

00:09:40.541 --> 00:09:42.061
And they've been doing that out in the

00:09:42.201 --> 00:09:42.520
open.

00:09:43.660 --> 00:09:44.000
Certainly,

00:09:44.201 --> 00:09:45.942
I've seen a lot of security

00:09:45.981 --> 00:09:47.261
vulnerabilities submitted to

00:09:47.861 --> 00:09:49.942
GitHub from Anthropic.

00:09:49.982 --> 00:09:51.923
I think one of the latest Mastodon

00:09:51.943 --> 00:09:55.346
security vulnerabilities in patches was

00:09:55.405 --> 00:09:56.846
submitted by Anthropic.

00:09:56.907 --> 00:09:59.548
So I believe I've seen contributions to

00:09:59.587 --> 00:10:01.168
that and to Firefox and a lot of

00:10:01.249 --> 00:10:03.309
other open source projects from them.

00:10:05.691 --> 00:10:06.130
Unfortunately,

00:10:06.150 --> 00:10:07.331
I just cannot find this source,

00:10:07.371 --> 00:10:08.451
but maybe I'll be able to pull it

00:10:08.511 --> 00:10:09.292
up later.

00:10:09.852 --> 00:10:13.053
But I saw some information about internal

00:10:13.094 --> 00:10:15.815
tools that Anthropic is using where the

00:10:15.855 --> 00:10:16.654
system prompt is like,

00:10:16.695 --> 00:10:18.475
create these security vulnerability

00:10:18.515 --> 00:10:22.096
patches without giving any indication that

00:10:22.256 --> 00:10:23.736
AI or cloud code is used at all.

00:10:25.317 --> 00:10:28.958
So it's very specifically told not to

00:10:29.058 --> 00:10:31.179
attribute anything to cloud or Anthropic.

00:10:31.820 --> 00:10:32.519
It's told...

00:10:34.471 --> 00:10:34.671
you know,

00:10:34.730 --> 00:10:36.533
not to include comments that might

00:10:36.572 --> 00:10:38.575
indicate it's AI, et cetera.

00:10:38.595 --> 00:10:41.317
So I think that that's really interesting

00:10:41.357 --> 00:10:42.018
that they are,

00:10:42.938 --> 00:10:44.279
I don't know what cases they're using

00:10:44.320 --> 00:10:45.321
those tools in.

00:10:46.221 --> 00:10:47.663
I would have to find out more information

00:10:47.682 --> 00:10:48.024
about that,

00:10:48.043 --> 00:10:51.427
but I think it's interesting that they are

00:10:51.466 --> 00:10:51.927
doing that.

00:10:53.200 --> 00:10:53.320
Yeah,

00:10:53.340 --> 00:10:54.341
it looks like you pulled up on the

00:10:54.461 --> 00:10:56.562
screen some of the instructions that I

00:10:56.583 --> 00:10:56.663
saw.

00:10:56.683 --> 00:10:56.764
Yeah,

00:10:56.783 --> 00:10:58.306
I found it on another article from Ars

00:10:58.326 --> 00:10:58.706
Technica.

00:10:58.745 --> 00:10:59.586
Yeah,

00:10:59.606 --> 00:11:00.969
I don't know where the original thing is.

00:11:01.028 --> 00:11:01.668
But yeah,

00:11:01.750 --> 00:11:04.393
basically they were saying there's an

00:11:04.452 --> 00:11:05.614
undercover mode.

00:11:05.634 --> 00:11:07.076
So as you can see there...

00:11:09.106 --> 00:11:10.687
they're basically telling Claude that

00:11:10.707 --> 00:11:12.708
they're operating undercover in a public

00:11:12.769 --> 00:11:13.929
open source repository.

00:11:14.009 --> 00:11:16.932
So they can't contain any Anthropic

00:11:17.251 --> 00:11:18.653
related information.

00:11:20.394 --> 00:11:22.335
I can imagine that's probably used because

00:11:22.375 --> 00:11:25.917
a lot of open source projects are very

00:11:26.037 --> 00:11:29.578
anti-AI contributions and anti-AI pull

00:11:29.599 --> 00:11:31.879
requests and just automatically close

00:11:31.899 --> 00:11:33.600
anything that's AI generated.

00:11:34.061 --> 00:11:35.481
So this is probably a way for them

00:11:35.562 --> 00:11:35.701
to

00:11:37.062 --> 00:11:39.583
um try and get around those restrictions

00:11:40.703 --> 00:11:43.164
whether that's a good idea for them to

00:11:43.184 --> 00:11:45.285
be doing or not i guess that's a

00:11:45.326 --> 00:11:48.346
debate but um it seems to be what

00:11:48.386 --> 00:11:50.148
they what they are doing and that's kind

00:11:50.187 --> 00:11:51.528
of confirmed with this so i thought that

00:11:51.548 --> 00:11:56.549
that was um fascinating yeah i agree i

00:11:56.951 --> 00:11:58.610
i feel very torn on that because on

00:11:58.630 --> 00:12:00.432
the one hand um

00:12:03.107 --> 00:12:04.389
there's probably an angle I'm missing

00:12:04.428 --> 00:12:04.609
here.

00:12:05.269 --> 00:12:05.889
On the one hand,

00:12:06.431 --> 00:12:07.611
I understand the idea of like,

00:12:07.652 --> 00:12:08.772
let's just assume they're doing that

00:12:08.792 --> 00:12:09.653
altruistically, right?

00:12:09.692 --> 00:12:10.874
Like we want to make these open source

00:12:10.913 --> 00:12:11.453
projects better.

00:12:11.494 --> 00:12:12.595
We want to make them more secure.

00:12:13.556 --> 00:12:13.775
You know,

00:12:13.855 --> 00:12:16.817
like I don't think at Privacy Guides,

00:12:16.837 --> 00:12:17.979
for example, correct me if I'm wrong,

00:12:18.278 --> 00:12:20.500
we don't typically go out and solicit

00:12:20.520 --> 00:12:21.282
people to like, hey,

00:12:21.302 --> 00:12:22.562
come check out our website and make sure

00:12:22.582 --> 00:12:23.763
all this information is accurate.

00:12:24.224 --> 00:12:26.144
But we totally welcome it if somebody does

00:12:26.184 --> 00:12:27.206
come up and they're like, hey,

00:12:27.265 --> 00:12:29.587
I found an inaccuracy and they report it.

00:12:30.207 --> 00:12:31.227
And I feel like that's kind of what

00:12:31.248 --> 00:12:32.609
they're doing is, you know,

00:12:32.668 --> 00:12:33.129
on the one hand,

00:12:33.149 --> 00:12:34.369
it's like it's still creating a more

00:12:34.408 --> 00:12:35.450
secure project, right?

00:12:35.490 --> 00:12:37.490
Assuming that the bug report is good.

00:12:37.551 --> 00:12:40.792
I know that's historically been a problem

00:12:40.812 --> 00:12:42.471
is a lot of AI slot bug reports

00:12:42.491 --> 00:12:44.732
that aren't really valid and they're not

00:12:44.773 --> 00:12:46.653
really bugs or whatever the case.

00:12:47.254 --> 00:12:48.774
And semi-related,

00:12:48.793 --> 00:12:50.195
but I did see an article earlier this

00:12:50.235 --> 00:12:50.394
week.

00:12:50.761 --> 00:12:52.342
that said that actually there's been a

00:12:52.423 --> 00:12:54.562
noticeable increase in quality on AI bug

00:12:54.602 --> 00:12:54.964
reports.

00:12:55.083 --> 00:12:57.104
So maybe they're starting to make some

00:12:57.144 --> 00:12:57.745
progress on that.

00:12:57.784 --> 00:12:59.325
But either way, point being,

00:12:59.605 --> 00:13:01.086
I understand the idea of the end result

00:13:01.125 --> 00:13:02.385
is the same and either way it makes

00:13:02.405 --> 00:13:03.366
the project more secure.

00:13:03.807 --> 00:13:05.466
But it also feels very disrespectful of

00:13:05.506 --> 00:13:09.729
like, if I don't want AI reporting it,

00:13:09.788 --> 00:13:10.729
why would you go out of your way

00:13:10.749 --> 00:13:11.690
to hide that?

00:13:12.549 --> 00:13:13.269
And I don't know,

00:13:13.350 --> 00:13:14.610
it's a really weird thing and I don't

00:13:14.630 --> 00:13:15.551
know how to feel about it.

00:13:15.890 --> 00:13:16.831
But I did see that too.

00:13:16.871 --> 00:13:17.851
That's really strange.

00:13:18.299 --> 00:13:20.282
yeah i would be really interested to see

00:13:20.322 --> 00:13:23.785
data on like all of the security related

00:13:23.865 --> 00:13:25.947
pull requests or vulnerability reports

00:13:25.988 --> 00:13:27.990
that anthropic specifically has reported

00:13:28.009 --> 00:13:29.611
because i feel like there's two different

00:13:29.652 --> 00:13:32.134
types of ai contributions to to these

00:13:32.174 --> 00:13:33.515
projects i think a lot of them are

00:13:33.535 --> 00:13:37.100
kind of slop contributions because a lot

00:13:37.200 --> 00:13:37.320
of

00:13:38.222 --> 00:13:39.465
a lot of people in the open source

00:13:39.485 --> 00:13:43.489
space or some students, for example,

00:13:43.528 --> 00:13:46.373
they want to pad their GitHub profiles

00:13:46.413 --> 00:13:47.693
because it looks more attractive to

00:13:47.714 --> 00:13:48.154
developers.

00:13:48.215 --> 00:13:50.597
I see that quite a bit where if

00:13:50.618 --> 00:13:52.239
you can get like a PR merge into

00:13:52.259 --> 00:13:52.919
a major project,

00:13:52.940 --> 00:13:53.461
it just kind of

00:13:54.437 --> 00:13:55.597
looks good for you.

00:13:55.717 --> 00:13:57.860
And so I think a lot of people

00:13:57.879 --> 00:14:00.240
are just spreading a wide net and just

00:14:00.542 --> 00:14:02.503
submitting a ton of AI slot pull requests

00:14:02.543 --> 00:14:03.823
and hoping that some of them get accepted,

00:14:03.844 --> 00:14:06.066
which is very annoying for open source

00:14:06.086 --> 00:14:06.625
maintainers.

00:14:07.466 --> 00:14:08.386
But on the other hand,

00:14:08.548 --> 00:14:10.129
if Anthropic themselves,

00:14:10.168 --> 00:14:11.950
if they have a legitimate interest in

00:14:11.990 --> 00:14:14.032
improving open source tools,

00:14:14.091 --> 00:14:16.192
which they probably do because a lot of

00:14:16.212 --> 00:14:18.414
these big companies do use these open

00:14:18.455 --> 00:14:20.475
source tools themselves for a lot of

00:14:20.495 --> 00:14:21.136
different reasons,

00:14:21.716 --> 00:14:22.837
I can imagine that

00:14:24.403 --> 00:14:27.065
like somebody being like an engineer at

00:14:27.125 --> 00:14:29.586
Anthropic being paid to use AI and submit

00:14:29.606 --> 00:14:33.669
these pull requests might be doing a

00:14:33.710 --> 00:14:35.610
better job in not just completely

00:14:35.650 --> 00:14:38.072
submitting slop but like using AI to find

00:14:38.113 --> 00:14:39.714
these vulnerabilities and write this code

00:14:39.754 --> 00:14:41.014
but checking it themselves before

00:14:41.054 --> 00:14:43.437
submitting it and writing like explainers

00:14:43.456 --> 00:14:44.837
because they're getting paid to do this

00:14:44.918 --> 00:14:46.778
unlike the people who are just you know

00:14:47.279 --> 00:14:48.520
rapid fire submitting

00:14:49.240 --> 00:14:51.042
vulnerability reports and PRs, right?

00:14:51.422 --> 00:14:52.643
I don't know if that's true or not,

00:14:52.682 --> 00:14:55.744
but I would imagine Anthropic would

00:14:55.783 --> 00:14:57.424
probably argue that that's true and would

00:14:57.465 --> 00:14:59.686
probably use that as the reason that

00:15:00.225 --> 00:15:01.027
they're doing this.

00:15:02.508 --> 00:15:03.028
And like I said,

00:15:03.087 --> 00:15:06.249
I have definitely seen AI companies report

00:15:06.288 --> 00:15:08.110
security vulnerabilities that were patched

00:15:08.169 --> 00:15:09.130
to open source projects,

00:15:09.150 --> 00:15:10.150
and some of them were major

00:15:10.191 --> 00:15:10.851
vulnerabilities.

00:15:10.932 --> 00:15:14.533
So there is some merit to the idea

00:15:14.552 --> 00:15:16.734
that AI can find these vulnerabilities

00:15:18.014 --> 00:15:19.716
more easily than, I mean,

00:15:19.816 --> 00:15:20.876
I don't know if it's more easily than

00:15:20.917 --> 00:15:22.317
people who are auditing the code,

00:15:22.378 --> 00:15:24.480
but it certainly is happening.

00:15:25.100 --> 00:15:27.741
So yeah, I mean,

00:15:27.942 --> 00:15:31.345
if all of the reports that Anthropic

00:15:31.365 --> 00:15:34.528
themselves are submitting are accurate and

00:15:34.567 --> 00:15:36.048
worthwhile to fix,

00:15:38.591 --> 00:15:40.011
I don't know if that's necessarily a

00:15:40.072 --> 00:15:40.432
problem.

00:15:40.552 --> 00:15:41.513
But of course, people are

00:15:42.802 --> 00:15:45.604
all along the spectrum of AI and AI

00:15:45.744 --> 00:15:47.865
contributions and AI code specifically.

00:15:47.965 --> 00:15:49.666
So yeah,

00:15:49.806 --> 00:15:51.687
I think that's going to be quite a

00:15:51.727 --> 00:15:54.668
debate in the open source community for a

00:15:54.729 --> 00:15:55.149
while,

00:15:55.269 --> 00:15:56.791
and I don't know how people are going

00:15:56.811 --> 00:16:00.153
to handle that.

00:16:00.192 --> 00:16:01.774
Yeah, I don't know either.

00:16:03.195 --> 00:16:04.576
It seems like one of the better uses

00:16:04.596 --> 00:16:05.635
of AI, in my opinion,

00:16:05.735 --> 00:16:10.119
as opposed to writing songs or putting out

00:16:10.379 --> 00:16:11.039
blog posts.

00:16:12.426 --> 00:16:13.905
It's still just, yeah.

00:16:14.187 --> 00:16:17.606
Like you said, what, what would be the,

00:16:17.648 --> 00:16:19.207
I wonder what the success ratio is,

00:16:19.268 --> 00:16:20.447
especially from Claude.

00:16:20.467 --> 00:16:21.629
And is there a human review?

00:16:21.749 --> 00:16:22.948
It doesn't sound like it from that,

00:16:23.068 --> 00:16:24.168
that snippet that I shared,

00:16:24.229 --> 00:16:25.710
but that's personally,

00:16:25.750 --> 00:16:26.509
that's where I fall.

00:16:26.529 --> 00:16:26.730
Like,

00:16:26.789 --> 00:16:28.630
I don't mind and I'm not a developer,

00:16:28.650 --> 00:16:30.230
so maybe I just don't understand how,

00:16:30.350 --> 00:16:31.650
how bad the problem is, but like,

00:16:32.131 --> 00:16:32.631
I would imagine,

00:16:32.751 --> 00:16:34.471
I don't mind if AI helps you find

00:16:34.491 --> 00:16:35.091
the vulnerability,

00:16:35.152 --> 00:16:36.472
as long as a human looks it over.

00:16:37.332 --> 00:16:40.315
um but yeah i'm sure there's a lot

00:16:40.336 --> 00:16:41.395
of people that are not doing that

00:16:41.535 --> 00:16:43.878
unfortunately so yeah i mean we've we've

00:16:43.898 --> 00:16:45.799
definitely talked about this in the

00:16:45.840 --> 00:16:47.921
privacy guys community and when we're

00:16:47.941 --> 00:16:49.361
talking about all these different tools

00:16:49.381 --> 00:16:52.043
that we recommend um people really want to

00:16:52.085 --> 00:16:55.027
see audits but they're extremely expensive

00:16:55.366 --> 00:16:58.509
and um if ai is not being used

00:16:58.528 --> 00:17:00.530
to like write new code but it's being

00:17:00.730 --> 00:17:02.331
used as like a second pair of eyes

00:17:02.392 --> 00:17:03.894
to take a look at all of this

00:17:03.913 --> 00:17:06.536
code that could be a good thing um

00:17:08.017 --> 00:17:08.277
You know,

00:17:08.616 --> 00:17:12.878
it is not going to be perfectly accurate,

00:17:12.959 --> 00:17:14.099
but if we're being honest,

00:17:14.140 --> 00:17:15.840
all of these security audits that projects

00:17:15.861 --> 00:17:17.862
are paying for are not completely accurate

00:17:17.882 --> 00:17:19.804
or totally thorough either.

00:17:20.604 --> 00:17:22.805
And they're certainly going to be cheaper

00:17:22.825 --> 00:17:26.247
to run AI than have a whole team

00:17:26.267 --> 00:17:28.228
of people auditing this code.

00:17:28.288 --> 00:17:31.790
So while I would imagine it's probably

00:17:31.810 --> 00:17:32.411
going to...

00:17:34.530 --> 00:17:37.393
be worse quality and probably have more

00:17:37.492 --> 00:17:39.574
false positives if you're using AI.

00:17:39.673 --> 00:17:43.557
I do think that doing it and revealing

00:17:43.596 --> 00:17:45.317
some of these vulnerabilities is probably

00:17:45.337 --> 00:17:47.038
better for a lot of open source code

00:17:47.058 --> 00:17:49.621
bases than not doing any sort of audits

00:17:49.701 --> 00:17:52.742
at all and just hoping that the maintainer

00:17:52.803 --> 00:17:53.824
catches all of these bugs.

00:17:53.884 --> 00:17:57.286
So I can definitely see a use case

00:17:57.306 --> 00:17:57.506
here.

00:17:57.625 --> 00:17:59.007
It's a tricky situation.

00:18:00.717 --> 00:18:01.357
Yeah, for sure.

00:18:01.978 --> 00:18:03.318
I know it's not really AI per se,

00:18:03.338 --> 00:18:05.580
but I know, and you probably do too.

00:18:05.641 --> 00:18:07.122
I get the emails from GitHub every once

00:18:07.142 --> 00:18:07.422
in a while.

00:18:07.442 --> 00:18:08.202
That's like, Hey,

00:18:08.723 --> 00:18:10.984
there's a thing that you use NPM or

00:18:11.005 --> 00:18:11.385
whatever,

00:18:11.526 --> 00:18:13.067
and there's like a vulnerability go ahead

00:18:13.086 --> 00:18:13.708
and upgrade.

00:18:14.428 --> 00:18:16.309
So yeah, I, I would be, uh,

00:18:16.329 --> 00:18:18.290
I don't know.

00:18:18.310 --> 00:18:18.811
I mean, mine's,

00:18:18.872 --> 00:18:20.073
mine's just a static website,

00:18:20.093 --> 00:18:21.334
so I can't imagine the damage would be

00:18:21.433 --> 00:18:22.434
too terrible,

00:18:22.474 --> 00:18:25.457
but still it's nice to get that proactive

00:18:25.737 --> 00:18:26.917
without having to go out and get a

00:18:26.958 --> 00:18:28.058
whole code audit thing.

00:18:28.098 --> 00:18:30.300
So useful stuff.

00:18:32.672 --> 00:18:36.535
But I don't have anything to add to

00:18:36.575 --> 00:18:38.296
that story unless you did.

00:18:38.777 --> 00:18:40.357
Did you want to tell us about this

00:18:40.397 --> 00:18:41.699
next story out of California?

00:18:42.659 --> 00:18:43.079
Yeah.

00:18:43.140 --> 00:18:45.681
So this one was reported by the Los

00:18:45.740 --> 00:18:46.602
Angeles Times.

00:18:47.142 --> 00:18:49.044
Their headline is California bill would

00:18:49.104 --> 00:18:51.645
require parent bloggers to delete content

00:18:51.726 --> 00:18:53.727
of minors on social media.

00:18:54.126 --> 00:18:54.887
Yeah.

00:18:57.026 --> 00:18:59.788
So they have a quote here from somebody

00:19:00.107 --> 00:19:01.088
directly impacted.

00:19:02.068 --> 00:19:02.490
It says,

00:19:02.589 --> 00:19:04.010
as the daughter of a social media

00:19:04.171 --> 00:19:04.770
influencer,

00:19:04.911 --> 00:19:06.792
Kami Barrett says she navigates life

00:19:06.813 --> 00:19:08.314
within a digital footprint she wished

00:19:08.334 --> 00:19:08.973
never existed.

00:19:09.374 --> 00:19:11.675
Everything my mom posted is still on

00:19:11.955 --> 00:19:13.257
social media, she said.

00:19:13.616 --> 00:19:15.238
Photos I wish never saw the light of

00:19:15.278 --> 00:19:17.118
day, private details about my health,

00:19:17.199 --> 00:19:18.980
even when I started my first menstrual

00:19:19.040 --> 00:19:19.361
cycle.

00:19:20.181 --> 00:19:22.162
She was saying this at a Wednesday news

00:19:22.201 --> 00:19:24.163
conference to advocate for Senate Bill,

00:19:25.803 --> 00:19:28.084
which would require social media platforms

00:19:28.104 --> 00:19:31.246
to offer a process for adults to request

00:19:31.286 --> 00:19:32.885
the removal of content that features

00:19:32.905 --> 00:19:35.047
themselves as minors and was created by a

00:19:35.086 --> 00:19:37.448
family member who received compensation

00:19:37.468 --> 00:19:40.048
for sharing material online.

00:19:42.609 --> 00:19:44.830
So yeah, this is an interesting story,

00:19:44.871 --> 00:19:46.691
and I guess it specifically relates to all

00:19:46.730 --> 00:19:49.873
of these family influencers that we see,

00:19:49.893 --> 00:19:51.393
which has definitely become more of a

00:19:51.452 --> 00:19:54.213
problem lately.

00:19:54.614 --> 00:19:55.634
Especially, I would imagine,

00:19:55.814 --> 00:19:57.375
in California.

00:19:59.895 --> 00:20:01.655
So it's interesting,

00:20:02.297 --> 00:20:04.217
but probably makes sense that this is only

00:20:04.257 --> 00:20:05.357
going to apply to...

00:20:07.542 --> 00:20:08.923
kind of public influencers,

00:20:09.044 --> 00:20:11.325
ones who are receiving money or

00:20:11.404 --> 00:20:13.184
sponsorships in exchange for all of this

00:20:13.205 --> 00:20:13.526
stuff.

00:20:14.625 --> 00:20:16.606
But it is only going to be available

00:20:16.666 --> 00:20:17.626
for adults.

00:20:17.646 --> 00:20:19.127
So there isn't really a process that

00:20:19.647 --> 00:20:21.469
prevents any of this stuff from being

00:20:21.588 --> 00:20:27.092
posted in the first place or anything like

00:20:27.132 --> 00:20:27.372
that.

00:20:27.412 --> 00:20:30.952
It's only a retroactive thing that

00:20:32.814 --> 00:20:34.694
adults can do about their childhood if

00:20:34.775 --> 00:20:37.576
they were a part of like a family

00:20:37.635 --> 00:20:43.578
influencer situation um does i i would say

00:20:43.598 --> 00:20:44.858
i don't know if that makes a lot

00:20:44.878 --> 00:20:46.400
of sense from my perspective because i

00:20:46.420 --> 00:20:48.221
think as we always say um

00:20:49.881 --> 00:20:51.540
anything that you post on the internet is

00:20:51.580 --> 00:20:53.162
sort of permanent all of this stuff is

00:20:53.182 --> 00:20:55.142
going to be archived and it could be

00:20:55.182 --> 00:20:56.801
potentially years before you're able to

00:20:56.823 --> 00:20:59.403
take any of this stuff down so uh

00:20:59.423 --> 00:21:01.462
children who are like uncomfortable with

00:21:01.523 --> 00:21:04.304
all of this going on um at the

00:21:04.324 --> 00:21:05.584
moment i don't think have a lot of

00:21:05.844 --> 00:21:10.805
protections um and i don't know um how

00:21:10.826 --> 00:21:12.066
that should be handled to be honest i

00:21:12.086 --> 00:21:13.425
know that that's been a debate that's been

00:21:13.445 --> 00:21:16.926
going on for quite a while how children

00:21:16.946 --> 00:21:17.326
should be

00:21:18.166 --> 00:21:20.611
um like compensated for that is that

00:21:20.631 --> 00:21:23.875
considered child labor um there's all

00:21:23.894 --> 00:21:26.278
sorts of laws especially in the

00:21:26.317 --> 00:21:29.201
entertainment industry and in hollywood

00:21:29.402 --> 00:21:32.886
and on the internet um that that come

00:21:32.906 --> 00:21:33.807
into play here so

00:21:35.309 --> 00:21:36.309
I don't know if this is going to

00:21:36.349 --> 00:21:39.030
really impact a lot of the people that

00:21:39.090 --> 00:21:41.730
we see in the privacy guides community who

00:21:41.750 --> 00:21:43.511
are trying to clean up their digital

00:21:43.551 --> 00:21:44.092
footprint,

00:21:44.172 --> 00:21:45.852
because I think a lot of people are

00:21:45.892 --> 00:21:49.133
more concerned about smaller scale

00:21:49.653 --> 00:21:51.472
situations than some of these commercial

00:21:51.492 --> 00:21:53.012
ventures that this bill is going to

00:21:53.053 --> 00:21:53.713
attack.

00:21:53.733 --> 00:21:56.413
But I do think it's a good idea

00:21:56.513 --> 00:22:00.194
for more privacy protections and some sort

00:22:00.255 --> 00:22:00.335
of

00:22:01.115 --> 00:22:03.415
process to get that data removed if you

00:22:03.435 --> 00:22:04.596
are an adult and you don't want that

00:22:04.615 --> 00:22:05.435
information out there.

00:22:05.516 --> 00:22:07.576
So it seems to be a good thing.

00:22:07.737 --> 00:22:10.777
I'm not sure how effective it'll be or

00:22:10.797 --> 00:22:11.917
if it goes far enough,

00:22:12.097 --> 00:22:14.657
but I think any protections and processes

00:22:14.678 --> 00:22:17.519
to protect your privacy are good at the

00:22:17.538 --> 00:22:18.038
end of the day.

00:22:19.638 --> 00:22:21.279
Was there anything you wanted to note in

00:22:21.299 --> 00:22:22.000
this article, Nate?

00:22:23.440 --> 00:22:25.381
No, I agree with you.

00:22:25.661 --> 00:22:26.121
It's funny.

00:22:28.101 --> 00:22:29.402
I think most people would agree I'm a

00:22:29.461 --> 00:22:29.902
lot more

00:22:31.152 --> 00:22:33.157
lenient with some privacy stuff than a lot

00:22:33.179 --> 00:22:34.241
of other privacy people are.

00:22:34.884 --> 00:22:36.167
But like kids are kind of one of

00:22:36.188 --> 00:22:37.853
the few things where I'm actually kind of

00:22:37.893 --> 00:22:38.134
like,

00:22:39.229 --> 00:22:39.989
like in a perfect world,

00:22:40.048 --> 00:22:41.128
I think it should be illegal to post

00:22:41.169 --> 00:22:42.470
pictures of your kids online at all.

00:22:42.769 --> 00:22:45.210
Um, or at very least publicly, like,

00:22:45.230 --> 00:22:45.390
you know,

00:22:45.410 --> 00:22:46.431
if you're going to post pictures of your

00:22:46.451 --> 00:22:46.691
kids,

00:22:46.730 --> 00:22:49.631
it has to be in like a closed

00:22:49.651 --> 00:22:50.692
group chat or like a,

00:22:50.711 --> 00:22:53.372
a friends only Facebook post again in a

00:22:53.432 --> 00:22:54.673
perfect world, there wouldn't be Facebook,

00:22:54.712 --> 00:22:55.712
but that's beside the point.

00:22:56.393 --> 00:22:57.752
Um, so like, yeah, this, I,

00:22:58.073 --> 00:22:58.712
and I agree with you.

00:22:58.732 --> 00:22:59.334
It's really sad.

00:22:59.394 --> 00:23:01.134
Cause like, even in this article, um,

00:23:01.213 --> 00:23:01.614
one of the,

00:23:02.653 --> 00:23:04.654
one of the people they talked to said

00:23:04.694 --> 00:23:05.154
that, um,

00:23:07.253 --> 00:23:08.555
I think it was that first girl, Barrett.

00:23:09.496 --> 00:23:10.316
Yeah, Kami Barrett.

00:23:10.355 --> 00:23:10.957
Further down,

00:23:11.477 --> 00:23:13.898
she says that she recalled being a target

00:23:13.919 --> 00:23:15.339
for predators and online bullying,

00:23:15.619 --> 00:23:16.961
said her mother was aware of the problems

00:23:17.020 --> 00:23:17.381
it created,

00:23:17.421 --> 00:23:18.842
but continued to share her daughter's life

00:23:18.882 --> 00:23:19.563
on social media.

00:23:19.843 --> 00:23:22.285
So, like, cool, thanks.

00:23:22.365 --> 00:23:24.826
Now that I'm twenty, twenty-five, thirty,

00:23:25.807 --> 00:23:26.907
I can ask you to take it down,

00:23:26.928 --> 00:23:28.429
but that doesn't help me when I'm ten,

00:23:28.588 --> 00:23:30.770
fifteen, sixteen, seventeen.

00:23:31.451 --> 00:23:32.332
You know, like you said,

00:23:32.372 --> 00:23:33.853
the damage is already done in so many

00:23:33.893 --> 00:23:34.472
ways, and...

00:23:36.874 --> 00:23:39.453
I mean, I guess, yeah, I don't know.

00:23:39.513 --> 00:23:40.335
It's just, it's crazy.

00:23:40.515 --> 00:23:42.755
And it's one thing I thought was

00:23:42.775 --> 00:23:44.375
interesting is it says the legislation

00:23:44.454 --> 00:23:46.655
requires that social media platforms offer

00:23:46.695 --> 00:23:48.215
a process for adults to request the

00:23:48.715 --> 00:23:49.736
removal of content.

00:23:50.155 --> 00:23:52.176
And then basically from there,

00:23:52.376 --> 00:23:54.396
they pass it on to the parent and

00:23:54.416 --> 00:23:55.717
the parent has ten days to take it

00:23:55.757 --> 00:23:56.037
down.

00:23:56.156 --> 00:23:56.897
After ten days,

00:23:56.917 --> 00:23:58.218
they get a three thousand dollar a day

00:23:58.238 --> 00:23:58.657
fine.

00:23:59.218 --> 00:24:00.857
So I don't know.

00:24:00.917 --> 00:24:02.258
It's just it's really I'm with you.

00:24:02.298 --> 00:24:03.638
I feel like it doesn't go far enough

00:24:03.739 --> 00:24:04.259
and it doesn't.

00:24:05.935 --> 00:24:07.317
it's not proactive enough,

00:24:07.917 --> 00:24:08.759
but at the same time, I mean,

00:24:08.798 --> 00:24:09.900
I guess it's better than nothing.

00:24:10.119 --> 00:24:13.502
And I think that's, I don't know.

00:24:13.743 --> 00:24:13.884
It's.

00:24:14.586 --> 00:24:15.205
It frustrates me.

00:24:15.465 --> 00:24:16.826
I wish it would do more,

00:24:17.067 --> 00:24:18.948
but it's a story for sure.

00:24:19.307 --> 00:24:20.488
A couple of things to note about this

00:24:20.548 --> 00:24:20.989
story.

00:24:21.969 --> 00:24:23.089
This bill hasn't passed yet.

00:24:23.109 --> 00:24:23.990
It's just a proposal.

00:24:24.450 --> 00:24:26.810
But this the person in question in this

00:24:26.871 --> 00:24:28.872
article was talking about their support

00:24:28.912 --> 00:24:29.352
for it.

00:24:31.333 --> 00:24:34.993
The other thing I would note is similar

00:24:35.013 --> 00:24:36.634
laws do exist in a couple of other

00:24:36.674 --> 00:24:38.236
states, including here in Minnesota.

00:24:38.596 --> 00:24:40.215
There are some laws that

00:24:42.057 --> 00:24:46.740
here restrict um more highly how children

00:24:46.820 --> 00:24:49.262
can participate in like commercial content

00:24:49.303 --> 00:24:51.605
in the first place um so I think

00:24:51.625 --> 00:24:53.066
if you're under thirteen you can't

00:24:53.165 --> 00:24:56.449
actively uh participate in any of this

00:24:56.828 --> 00:24:58.971
content creation at all you can maybe be

00:24:59.050 --> 00:25:01.012
featured in it but you can't be um

00:25:02.028 --> 00:25:03.169
Like an active part in it,

00:25:03.189 --> 00:25:04.789
so I think that in Minnesota,

00:25:04.809 --> 00:25:06.431
at least a lot of those toy unboxing

00:25:06.471 --> 00:25:08.133
channels where people have their children

00:25:08.212 --> 00:25:09.733
unbox a bunch of toys and that kind

00:25:09.753 --> 00:25:11.015
of thing that's not allowed.

00:25:13.135 --> 00:25:16.077
teenagers here in Minnesota are allowed to

00:25:16.198 --> 00:25:16.778
participate,

00:25:16.798 --> 00:25:18.819
but there are laws in both of these

00:25:18.839 --> 00:25:20.582
situations around how that revenue is

00:25:20.642 --> 00:25:22.982
split between everyone involved,

00:25:23.403 --> 00:25:25.045
so there are some protections I think for

00:25:25.085 --> 00:25:26.986
people participating in these commercial

00:25:27.006 --> 00:25:27.426
ventures.

00:25:27.906 --> 00:25:30.249
But from a privacy perspective,

00:25:30.288 --> 00:25:33.530
I think they probably don't go far enough

00:25:34.570 --> 00:25:35.152
in any case.

00:25:36.192 --> 00:25:38.272
But it is interesting to see how this

00:25:38.292 --> 00:25:39.012
is being handled.

00:25:39.133 --> 00:25:41.013
It is a very, I think,

00:25:41.114 --> 00:25:44.836
new issue with the internet and everything

00:25:44.895 --> 00:25:48.116
that none of the existing laws were really

00:25:49.018 --> 00:25:53.579
equipped to handle around child labor and

00:25:53.799 --> 00:25:54.460
stuff like that.

00:25:54.519 --> 00:25:56.500
So it's good that this is at least

00:25:56.540 --> 00:25:57.340
getting attention,

00:25:57.540 --> 00:25:58.741
and we'll see how this plays out.

00:26:00.801 --> 00:26:00.981
Yeah,

00:26:01.061 --> 00:26:02.522
it does say in California they have a

00:26:02.563 --> 00:26:04.462
law that was signed two years ago that

00:26:04.502 --> 00:26:06.044
content creators that feature minors and

00:26:06.064 --> 00:26:07.483
at least thirty percent of the material

00:26:07.503 --> 00:26:08.904
have to place some of their earnings into

00:26:08.924 --> 00:26:10.545
a trust that children can access when they

00:26:10.565 --> 00:26:11.184
turn eighteen.

00:26:11.244 --> 00:26:12.645
So, yeah, like you said,

00:26:12.685 --> 00:26:14.665
there's there's some it's an issue that's

00:26:14.685 --> 00:26:16.047
starting to get attention for sure.

00:26:16.287 --> 00:26:16.426
But.

00:26:17.938 --> 00:26:19.057
Also, just on a personal note,

00:26:19.077 --> 00:26:20.398
they interviewed Alison Stoner,

00:26:20.419 --> 00:26:22.398
who they said was a former child actor

00:26:22.419 --> 00:26:23.719
who appeared in films like Step Up and

00:26:23.739 --> 00:26:24.500
Cheaper by the Dozen.

00:26:25.319 --> 00:26:27.000
They were also Isabella in Phineas and

00:26:27.039 --> 00:26:28.401
Ferb, and no mention of that.

00:26:28.820 --> 00:26:30.121
And I feel so offended because I love

00:26:30.141 --> 00:26:31.641
that show.

00:26:31.861 --> 00:26:33.182
I just had to call that out.

00:26:33.362 --> 00:26:36.602
Interesting.

00:26:36.622 --> 00:26:36.982
I had to.

00:26:39.234 --> 00:26:40.056
So in a little bit,

00:26:40.175 --> 00:26:41.876
we are going to talk about LinkedIn's

00:26:41.978 --> 00:26:43.018
browser scanning.

00:26:43.298 --> 00:26:44.460
So that should be fun.

00:26:44.579 --> 00:26:45.279
But first,

00:26:45.641 --> 00:26:46.801
we're going to go ahead and jump into

00:26:46.942 --> 00:26:49.163
site updates and talk a little bit about

00:26:49.203 --> 00:26:50.805
what's been going on at Privacy Guides

00:26:50.845 --> 00:26:51.326
this week.

00:26:52.906 --> 00:26:53.968
Just this afternoon,

00:26:54.147 --> 00:26:55.450
we dropped a new video.

00:26:55.650 --> 00:26:57.070
It is currently members only.

00:26:58.853 --> 00:27:00.394
So we usually leave those members only for

00:27:00.413 --> 00:27:00.834
about a week.

00:27:01.214 --> 00:27:02.615
This one is about encrypted email.

00:27:04.590 --> 00:27:05.711
This is another one of those like really

00:27:05.731 --> 00:27:07.413
beginner friendly videos that if you're a

00:27:07.432 --> 00:27:08.292
bit of a privacy veteran,

00:27:08.313 --> 00:27:09.173
you probably know this stuff,

00:27:09.232 --> 00:27:10.453
but hopefully it's something that you can

00:27:10.473 --> 00:27:11.555
share with your friends and family.

00:27:11.575 --> 00:27:13.875
It talks about why mainstream providers

00:27:13.915 --> 00:27:16.096
like Gmail and Yahoo aren't quite good

00:27:16.136 --> 00:27:18.818
enough and how encrypted email works and

00:27:19.499 --> 00:27:20.880
some of the different ones we recommend,

00:27:20.940 --> 00:27:22.099
pros and cons of each.

00:27:22.299 --> 00:27:23.300
So yeah,

00:27:23.361 --> 00:27:24.421
if you are not a member yet and

00:27:24.441 --> 00:27:25.201
you want to check that out,

00:27:25.241 --> 00:27:27.762
you can join on YouTube or you can

00:27:27.803 --> 00:27:30.084
go to privacyguides.org slash donate and

00:27:30.204 --> 00:27:31.565
that will take you to a link where

00:27:31.585 --> 00:27:32.885
you can sign up for a membership.

00:27:33.836 --> 00:27:37.402
But that's what we did this week in

00:27:37.422 --> 00:27:38.503
the video department.

00:27:39.365 --> 00:27:41.188
And I will turn it over to Jonah.

00:27:41.481 --> 00:27:42.102
Very cool.

00:27:43.042 --> 00:27:46.183
Yeah, another thing we did recently,

00:27:46.704 --> 00:27:48.685
Nate and I recorded this a few weeks

00:27:48.705 --> 00:27:50.066
ago, but it's finally live.

00:27:50.807 --> 00:27:54.468
We did a panel discussion on the Firewalls

00:27:54.548 --> 00:27:56.930
Don't Stop Dragons podcast.

00:27:57.269 --> 00:27:59.010
So episode four seventy four of that

00:27:59.070 --> 00:28:00.912
podcast is now out.

00:28:00.951 --> 00:28:02.211
It's called Privacy Guides Panel.

00:28:02.251 --> 00:28:03.313
Nate and I are on it and we

00:28:03.353 --> 00:28:05.534
talked about a ton of interesting stuff.

00:28:07.434 --> 00:28:09.675
So I would definitely recommend checking

00:28:09.715 --> 00:28:15.317
that episode out if you want to listen

00:28:15.337 --> 00:28:16.398
to those discussions.

00:28:16.719 --> 00:28:18.019
You can look at the table of contents

00:28:18.059 --> 00:28:18.140
here.

00:28:18.160 --> 00:28:19.660
It looks like Nate's showing that on the

00:28:19.700 --> 00:28:20.000
screen,

00:28:20.020 --> 00:28:22.442
but you can find the Firewalls Don't Stop

00:28:22.461 --> 00:28:24.021
Dragons website for more information.

00:28:24.343 --> 00:28:25.522
And if any of those topics sound

00:28:25.623 --> 00:28:26.923
interesting to you,

00:28:27.845 --> 00:28:28.944
Definitely check it out because it was a

00:28:28.984 --> 00:28:30.807
ton of fun for us to record.

00:28:30.846 --> 00:28:32.509
I think we talked about a lot of

00:28:33.108 --> 00:28:35.931
cool, interesting, informative stuff.

00:28:36.332 --> 00:28:39.674
So hopefully somebody finds it useful or

00:28:39.835 --> 00:28:43.738
at least finds it entertaining.

00:28:44.077 --> 00:28:45.299
In other news,

00:28:45.460 --> 00:28:47.520
we again published a bunch of news briefs

00:28:47.540 --> 00:28:49.202
that we're not covering here on this show,

00:28:49.222 --> 00:28:50.943
but you can find our articles at

00:28:51.003 --> 00:28:53.767
privacyguides.org slash news about them.

00:28:56.828 --> 00:29:00.074
We have stories on Mac OS,

00:29:01.134 --> 00:29:03.898
improving security in the terminal app.

00:29:04.737 --> 00:29:06.719
a grandmother who was wrongfully arrested

00:29:06.759 --> 00:29:09.220
because of facial recognition, iOS,

00:29:09.299 --> 00:29:11.121
twenty six point five beta,

00:29:11.261 --> 00:29:13.323
including end to end encryption for RCS

00:29:13.363 --> 00:29:14.884
messages, Walmart,

00:29:15.284 --> 00:29:16.964
digital price labels and more.

00:29:17.465 --> 00:29:18.365
So definitely check that out.

00:29:18.425 --> 00:29:18.625
Again,

00:29:18.665 --> 00:29:21.387
it's privacyguides.org slash news if you

00:29:21.407 --> 00:29:23.990
want to read those stories and let us

00:29:24.029 --> 00:29:25.851
know if you have any questions about them

00:29:26.010 --> 00:29:27.311
on the forum or anything else,

00:29:27.332 --> 00:29:28.252
because there's always a lot of

00:29:28.292 --> 00:29:29.534
discussions about these stories.

00:29:30.213 --> 00:29:32.914
over there as well everything that we do

00:29:32.954 --> 00:29:35.737
at privacyguides is made possible by our

00:29:35.777 --> 00:29:37.518
supporters you can sign up for a

00:29:37.577 --> 00:29:40.538
membership or donate at privacyguides.org

00:29:40.578 --> 00:29:42.740
donate or you can support us by picking

00:29:42.779 --> 00:29:45.602
up some swag like this water bottle for

00:29:45.642 --> 00:29:48.323
example at shop.privacyguides.org

00:29:48.923 --> 00:29:50.605
Privacy Guides is a nonprofit which

00:29:50.765 --> 00:29:52.867
researches and shares privacy-related

00:29:52.928 --> 00:29:53.548
information,

00:29:53.729 --> 00:29:55.770
and we facilitate a community on our forum

00:29:55.790 --> 00:29:57.712
in Matrix where people can ask questions

00:29:58.034 --> 00:29:59.655
and get advice about staying private

00:29:59.715 --> 00:30:02.038
online and preserving their digital

00:30:02.077 --> 00:30:02.439
rights.

00:30:03.460 --> 00:30:05.863
Now let's move on to our next story.

00:30:05.982 --> 00:30:08.625
This is about NextCloud and OnlyOffice.

00:30:10.682 --> 00:30:12.424
That is right.

00:30:12.944 --> 00:30:15.207
So, um, full disclosure,

00:30:15.346 --> 00:30:16.627
I am a next cloud user and a

00:30:16.667 --> 00:30:18.390
little bit of a next cloud fan boy.

00:30:18.490 --> 00:30:21.152
So, um, I'm bummed to hear this story,

00:30:21.211 --> 00:30:23.733
but only office has suspended their

00:30:23.894 --> 00:30:25.836
partnership with next cloud for forking

00:30:25.875 --> 00:30:27.518
its project without permission.

00:30:28.137 --> 00:30:30.119
And this comes on the heels of another

00:30:30.200 --> 00:30:30.661
announcement.

00:30:30.681 --> 00:30:32.362
So earlier this week, uh,

00:30:32.422 --> 00:30:34.544
next cloud IONOS and several other

00:30:34.624 --> 00:30:35.644
European tech companies

00:30:36.092 --> 00:30:38.173
came together and announced this new open

00:30:38.213 --> 00:30:40.156
source project called Euro Office,

00:30:40.596 --> 00:30:41.617
which they describe as, quote,

00:30:41.718 --> 00:30:43.559
a sovereign replacement for Microsoft with

00:30:43.601 --> 00:30:44.981
intuitive interface and strong

00:30:45.001 --> 00:30:46.683
compatibility backed by European open

00:30:46.723 --> 00:30:47.484
source community.

00:30:49.247 --> 00:30:52.130
Only Office has basically claimed that

00:30:52.250 --> 00:30:54.553
this is a fork of their code.

00:30:55.544 --> 00:30:57.885
And they say that this violates license

00:30:57.905 --> 00:31:01.907
agreements because they offer only office

00:31:01.968 --> 00:31:03.648
is source available or open source.

00:31:04.049 --> 00:31:06.230
And they use the AGPL version three.

00:31:06.791 --> 00:31:09.113
So specifically towards the end here,

00:31:09.232 --> 00:31:10.574
if you're watching on screen,

00:31:10.594 --> 00:31:11.615
you can see this, but towards the end,

00:31:11.654 --> 00:31:14.076
it says we require compliance with

00:31:14.195 --> 00:31:15.457
applicable licensing conditions,

00:31:15.517 --> 00:31:15.817
including,

00:31:15.857 --> 00:31:17.238
but not limited to the preservation of

00:31:17.338 --> 00:31:19.440
only office branding logo and all required

00:31:19.519 --> 00:31:21.181
attribution elements as defined in our

00:31:21.221 --> 00:31:22.461
licensing terms, which is,

00:31:23.342 --> 00:31:24.583
If this is a brand new project,

00:31:24.643 --> 00:31:25.202
it would, of course,

00:31:25.242 --> 00:31:26.323
have none of those things.

00:31:27.563 --> 00:31:30.864
So for those who do not use Nextcloud,

00:31:30.923 --> 00:31:33.164
you may or may not know that Nextcloud,

00:31:33.224 --> 00:31:34.384
one of the things that it comes with

00:31:34.404 --> 00:31:37.546
by default is an online document editor or

00:31:37.665 --> 00:31:38.326
Office editor.

00:31:38.866 --> 00:31:40.247
And there's a couple different ways to

00:31:40.267 --> 00:31:40.826
make this work.

00:31:40.846 --> 00:31:42.847
You can use Collabora online,

00:31:43.367 --> 00:31:44.708
or you can use only Office.

00:31:45.147 --> 00:31:46.628
And this has been...

00:31:47.748 --> 00:31:49.132
I think they said for eight years,

00:31:49.251 --> 00:31:51.076
only Office has partnered with NextCloud,

00:31:51.156 --> 00:31:53.082
and now they are terminating that.

00:31:53.221 --> 00:31:54.003
They do say...

00:31:55.884 --> 00:31:56.986
I think they said that no, yeah,

00:31:57.046 --> 00:31:58.626
no existing partners or clients will be

00:31:58.646 --> 00:31:59.146
affected.

00:31:59.288 --> 00:32:00.508
So basically if you've already got it

00:32:00.528 --> 00:32:01.568
installed, you're good to go.

00:32:02.309 --> 00:32:03.871
I don't know what that means for updates

00:32:03.891 --> 00:32:05.211
and stuff, but yeah,

00:32:05.571 --> 00:32:06.313
I guess we'll find out.

00:32:06.813 --> 00:32:08.374
They also, interestingly, um,

00:32:08.394 --> 00:32:09.214
just to throw it out there,

00:32:09.394 --> 00:32:10.556
only office said that in the past,

00:32:10.576 --> 00:32:11.536
and I'm quoting the article here,

00:32:11.876 --> 00:32:13.377
next cloud has behaved in a manner not

00:32:13.417 --> 00:32:14.398
expected from a partner,

00:32:14.499 --> 00:32:16.000
including trying to poach its employees

00:32:16.019 --> 00:32:17.401
and influencing customers against the

00:32:17.441 --> 00:32:17.800
company,

00:32:18.141 --> 00:32:19.461
but directly forking the project and

00:32:19.501 --> 00:32:21.243
repacking it was the straw that broke the

00:32:21.284 --> 00:32:22.523
camel's back.

00:32:22.944 --> 00:32:23.105
Um,

00:32:23.740 --> 00:32:25.342
Yeah, then kind of a statement here.

00:32:25.382 --> 00:32:26.864
They said partnership is built on trust

00:32:26.884 --> 00:32:28.384
and trust requires shared principles where

00:32:28.404 --> 00:32:29.747
those principles are no longer upheld.

00:32:29.787 --> 00:32:31.088
Continuing operation is no longer

00:32:31.128 --> 00:32:31.608
sustainable.

00:32:31.628 --> 00:32:32.210
For this reason,

00:32:32.569 --> 00:32:33.811
we made the decision to suspend our

00:32:33.852 --> 00:32:35.133
partnership cooperation.

00:32:37.903 --> 00:32:38.704
And then just kind of, I guess,

00:32:38.724 --> 00:32:40.185
a little bit more background towards the

00:32:40.306 --> 00:32:40.567
end.

00:32:41.027 --> 00:32:43.429
Lever Office has criticized OnlyOffice for

00:32:43.469 --> 00:32:45.070
being, quote unquote, fake open source.

00:32:45.550 --> 00:32:46.531
They say, for one reason,

00:32:46.632 --> 00:32:48.374
OnlyOffice defaults to Microsoft Office

00:32:48.394 --> 00:32:52.377
formats like DocX, XLSX, and PPTX,

00:32:52.417 --> 00:32:54.859
which is Word, Excel, and PowerPoint,

00:32:55.200 --> 00:32:57.122
rather than open standards like Open

00:32:57.162 --> 00:32:58.542
Document Format or ODF.

00:33:00.005 --> 00:33:01.487
And there's also, apparently,

00:33:02.429 --> 00:33:04.310
Nextcloud says they didn't just

00:33:04.330 --> 00:33:06.012
collaborate directly with OnlyOffice.

00:33:07.715 --> 00:33:08.236
Let me rephrase that.

00:33:08.557 --> 00:33:09.718
When asked why they didn't just

00:33:09.739 --> 00:33:10.720
collaborate with OnlyOffice,

00:33:10.740 --> 00:33:11.820
they said that there were a number of

00:33:11.861 --> 00:33:12.261
reasons,

00:33:12.362 --> 00:33:13.864
including that OnlyOffice is a Russian

00:33:13.903 --> 00:33:15.707
company that tends to obscure its origins.

00:33:17.028 --> 00:33:18.628
Developers often leave code comments in

00:33:18.669 --> 00:33:20.270
Russian and many users are hesitant to use

00:33:20.290 --> 00:33:21.511
software potentially linked to the Russian

00:33:21.531 --> 00:33:21.872
government.

00:33:22.231 --> 00:33:23.353
They also claim the only office

00:33:23.373 --> 00:33:24.513
discourages contributions,

00:33:24.614 --> 00:33:25.775
ignores pull requests and lacks

00:33:25.795 --> 00:33:27.517
transparency since commit messages

00:33:27.537 --> 00:33:29.038
frequently reference internal issue

00:33:29.077 --> 00:33:29.979
trackers only.

00:33:30.038 --> 00:33:32.861
So yeah,

00:33:34.603 --> 00:33:35.403
I don't know that I have a lot

00:33:35.442 --> 00:33:36.844
of thoughts on this one.

00:33:38.266 --> 00:33:39.246
Jonah, did you have any,

00:33:39.987 --> 00:33:42.068
like what do you know about this AGPL

00:33:42.288 --> 00:33:43.430
V three, for example?

00:33:44.934 --> 00:33:51.076
Yeah, so what's in question here is, well,

00:33:51.217 --> 00:33:52.856
only office says that they've added

00:33:52.896 --> 00:33:57.759
provisions to AGPL requiring certain

00:33:59.699 --> 00:34:02.440
attribution in forks of the project.

00:34:03.580 --> 00:34:05.500
So we could,

00:34:08.802 --> 00:34:09.922
if I could share my screen here,

00:34:09.942 --> 00:34:11.623
let's see.

00:34:11.722 --> 00:34:11.882
Huh.

00:34:13.094 --> 00:34:15.476
So they're talking about in their license

00:34:16.717 --> 00:34:17.157
two things.

00:34:17.177 --> 00:34:18.818
You have to retain the original product

00:34:18.858 --> 00:34:20.599
logo when you distribute the program.

00:34:21.121 --> 00:34:23.922
And they do not grant any rights under

00:34:23.983 --> 00:34:28.005
trademark law for the use of any only

00:34:28.045 --> 00:34:29.067
office trademarks.

00:34:29.728 --> 00:34:35.251
And the Euro Office Project Initiative

00:34:35.932 --> 00:34:39.916
basically removed these provisions saying

00:34:39.976 --> 00:34:40.295
that

00:34:41.456 --> 00:34:42.898
Basically, if I can find it here,

00:34:42.938 --> 00:34:50.382
section seven of the AGPL says that you...

00:34:50.802 --> 00:34:51.501
Which line is this?

00:34:52.663 --> 00:34:54.903
Says that you can remove any additional

00:34:56.005 --> 00:34:58.646
restrictions or any of these terms from

00:34:58.686 --> 00:35:00.507
that license on your own.

00:35:00.927 --> 00:35:02.847
And this is kind of the basis of

00:35:02.987 --> 00:35:06.010
Euro Office's claim that they can kind of

00:35:06.050 --> 00:35:07.030
change this license.

00:35:07.110 --> 00:35:08.510
And they say that they don't have to

00:35:08.630 --> 00:35:09.751
use their logo to...

00:35:11.244 --> 00:35:12.927
Give attribution to OnlyOffice.

00:35:13.606 --> 00:35:15.429
The AGPL is still going to require that

00:35:15.469 --> 00:35:18.231
they provide some attribution somehow,

00:35:18.550 --> 00:35:20.913
but according to the Euro Office project,

00:35:20.932 --> 00:35:22.353
they don't have to use the OnlyOffice

00:35:22.393 --> 00:35:22.815
trademark.

00:35:23.215 --> 00:35:24.635
I think this is kind of interesting

00:35:24.856 --> 00:35:28.619
because usually open source projects like

00:35:29.260 --> 00:35:30.661
OnlyOffice in this position,

00:35:32.141 --> 00:35:34.204
fight tooth and nail for forks to not

00:35:34.344 --> 00:35:35.826
use their branding at all.

00:35:35.865 --> 00:35:37.206
So the fact that they want them to

00:35:37.306 --> 00:35:39.208
use their logo is kind of strange because

00:35:39.228 --> 00:35:41.010
we've seen like Mozilla, for example,

00:35:41.731 --> 00:35:43.072
when there's any Firefox forks,

00:35:43.092 --> 00:35:44.295
they want to make sure that there's no

00:35:44.375 --> 00:35:46.856
Firefox branding whatsoever associated

00:35:46.876 --> 00:35:47.737
with that because they don't want it

00:35:47.777 --> 00:35:48.920
associated with their

00:35:49.585 --> 00:35:52.565
project um and related to this there's

00:35:52.646 --> 00:35:56.626
actually another case um around it a few

00:35:56.666 --> 00:35:58.867
years ago this started and then there was

00:35:58.887 --> 00:36:00.307
a i think the latest update on this

00:36:00.327 --> 00:36:05.429
was in um but a company called neo

00:36:05.530 --> 00:36:10.371
four j um started a lawsuit against uh

00:36:10.411 --> 00:36:12.532
another company purethink and

00:36:14.331 --> 00:36:15.992
about a very similar issue.

00:36:16.353 --> 00:36:19.313
Basically Neo-FourJ added a lot of clauses

00:36:19.353 --> 00:36:21.574
to their AGPL license,

00:36:22.114 --> 00:36:27.396
and Neo-FourJ said that because the AGPL

00:36:27.416 --> 00:36:32.077
says that you can remove certain passages

00:36:32.297 --> 00:36:34.056
or restrictions that were added onto the

00:36:34.097 --> 00:36:35.777
AGPL, that they were able to do that.

00:36:36.338 --> 00:36:39.300
And Peerthink actually lost this case.

00:36:39.460 --> 00:36:41.420
This twenty twenty five article is

00:36:41.780 --> 00:36:43.601
basically announcing an appeal that's

00:36:43.621 --> 00:36:44.161
taking place.

00:36:44.222 --> 00:36:45.422
I don't know if that's actually gone to

00:36:45.463 --> 00:36:46.043
court yet,

00:36:48.043 --> 00:36:49.405
but they

00:36:52.751 --> 00:36:53.030
So yeah,

00:36:53.050 --> 00:36:55.711
this article says that the AGPL allows

00:36:55.771 --> 00:36:57.652
added-on terms like the Commons clause

00:36:57.672 --> 00:36:59.733
that Neo-FourJ was using to be stripped

00:36:59.753 --> 00:37:01.213
from the license.

00:37:03.434 --> 00:37:05.954
And Neo-FourJ said that because they added

00:37:05.994 --> 00:37:06.074
it,

00:37:06.114 --> 00:37:07.235
you have to comply with all of the

00:37:07.255 --> 00:37:08.016
terms of the license.

00:37:08.036 --> 00:37:09.976
And the court basically agreed that any

00:37:10.155 --> 00:37:12.476
terms in the license have to be followed

00:37:13.697 --> 00:37:16.097
regardless of what the AGPL says.

00:37:16.657 --> 00:37:18.699
And then the Free Software Foundation and

00:37:18.778 --> 00:37:20.500
other organizations in the open source

00:37:20.519 --> 00:37:20.920
space

00:37:22.800 --> 00:37:24.161
said that that's not the case and that

00:37:24.181 --> 00:37:29.547
they did intend this tenant or this

00:37:29.706 --> 00:37:33.271
provision in the AGPL to work and for

00:37:33.311 --> 00:37:34.851
these restrictions to be removed because

00:37:34.871 --> 00:37:37.394
they believe that you can't really have

00:37:37.434 --> 00:37:39.336
restrictions on free and open source

00:37:39.536 --> 00:37:39.936
software,

00:37:39.976 --> 00:37:42.438
which is kind of the point of the

00:37:42.579 --> 00:37:43.280
AGPL.

00:37:44.802 --> 00:37:44.981
So

00:37:46.949 --> 00:37:48.431
It's a strange case.

00:37:48.451 --> 00:37:49.811
It's definitely in a gray area.

00:37:50.192 --> 00:37:52.514
And it really depends on how much

00:37:52.715 --> 00:37:55.097
OnlyOffice wants to fight this.

00:37:55.137 --> 00:37:58.240
But I think you could certainly argue in

00:37:58.280 --> 00:38:00.023
the Neo-FourJ case and probably in this

00:38:00.123 --> 00:38:02.264
OnlyOffice case that any of these

00:38:02.304 --> 00:38:04.106
restrictions that are being added onto the

00:38:04.206 --> 00:38:05.829
AGPL that have very...

00:38:07.230 --> 00:38:08.972
specific restrictions on how the software

00:38:08.992 --> 00:38:11.255
can be used probably make the software not

00:38:11.797 --> 00:38:14.221
open source um so at the end of

00:38:14.240 --> 00:38:15.722
the day you shouldn't be calling it an

00:38:15.784 --> 00:38:18.748
agpo licensed project if you really want

00:38:18.788 --> 00:38:20.030
these terms to be followed i think that

00:38:20.050 --> 00:38:22.213
they would have to call it something else

00:38:22.253 --> 00:38:22.434
and it

00:38:23.911 --> 00:38:25.291
wouldn't be, I mean,

00:38:25.331 --> 00:38:27.233
it would be at odds with the open

00:38:27.293 --> 00:38:28.592
source in the same way that a lot

00:38:28.612 --> 00:38:30.713
of these source available licenses that we

00:38:30.793 --> 00:38:31.954
see are.

00:38:32.494 --> 00:38:36.255
It's definitely a hot debate in the

00:38:36.275 --> 00:38:37.775
community in general.

00:38:38.295 --> 00:38:39.675
We've seen a lot of talk about like

00:38:39.715 --> 00:38:41.617
the FUDO license, for example.

00:38:43.277 --> 00:38:45.099
not being open source and they went with

00:38:45.139 --> 00:38:46.440
a different name because of that.

00:38:47.460 --> 00:38:49.181
But there's certainly other licenses that

00:38:49.222 --> 00:38:51.583
projects are trying to use and they still

00:38:51.623 --> 00:38:53.826
continue to claim to be open source when

00:38:53.865 --> 00:38:55.447
in reality they're source available.

00:38:55.867 --> 00:38:58.248
So I think that if only Office really

00:38:58.730 --> 00:39:00.992
wants to follow through on having these

00:39:01.032 --> 00:39:02.112
restrictions in place,

00:39:02.913 --> 00:39:04.494
I think that would be very at odds

00:39:04.574 --> 00:39:06.416
with their claims that they are an open

00:39:06.516 --> 00:39:06.916
source

00:39:07.597 --> 00:39:10.739
project um which would be a bit concerning

00:39:11.039 --> 00:39:13.041
because the entire idea of open source is

00:39:13.081 --> 00:39:15.282
that these forks should be able to exist

00:39:15.782 --> 00:39:17.565
and like you should be able to completely

00:39:17.625 --> 00:39:22.228
fork and create um this euro office that

00:39:22.289 --> 00:39:26.112
nextcloud is making um without any

00:39:26.891 --> 00:39:29.775
restrictions or preservation of OnlyOffice

00:39:30.195 --> 00:39:30.797
branding.

00:39:31.677 --> 00:39:33.179
That doesn't make a lot of sense for

00:39:33.199 --> 00:39:34.601
a fork to be doing.

00:39:35.141 --> 00:39:37.224
And so OnlyOffice is in a bit of

00:39:37.244 --> 00:39:39.586
a strange situation here.

00:39:41.168 --> 00:39:42.271
It's always the business

00:39:43.338 --> 00:39:46.041
pace against open source software in

00:39:46.081 --> 00:39:46.402
general.

00:39:46.422 --> 00:39:48.123
They don't want people taking their work.

00:39:48.422 --> 00:39:50.284
And OnlyOffice clearly believes that

00:39:50.324 --> 00:39:52.646
because they say that they've spent years

00:39:52.686 --> 00:39:54.728
building a fully functional production

00:39:54.768 --> 00:39:56.210
ready Office document editor.

00:39:56.670 --> 00:39:57.550
But at the same time,

00:39:57.570 --> 00:39:59.192
they marketed that as an open source

00:39:59.233 --> 00:39:59.652
project.

00:39:59.893 --> 00:40:02.695
And that is what people kind of expect

00:40:02.715 --> 00:40:04.077
from that.

00:40:04.137 --> 00:40:05.016
I would also note,

00:40:07.018 --> 00:40:09.041
Nextcloud kind of has a history of

00:40:10.579 --> 00:40:14.106
forking open source projects um in not a

00:40:14.126 --> 00:40:17.454
very collaborative way i mean their next

00:40:17.474 --> 00:40:19.336
cloud itself was forked from own cloud of

00:40:19.376 --> 00:40:22.402
course and that division was um

00:40:23.806 --> 00:40:25.427
I don't think super well received by

00:40:25.527 --> 00:40:26.447
OwnCloud themselves.

00:40:26.927 --> 00:40:30.009
So it's kind of a situation that they're

00:40:30.068 --> 00:40:30.369
used to.

00:40:30.409 --> 00:40:32.710
But I think a lot of people side

00:40:32.750 --> 00:40:34.831
with Nextcloud in that case.

00:40:34.871 --> 00:40:36.090
And I think that a lot of people

00:40:36.231 --> 00:40:39.793
are going to side with Nextcloud here as

00:40:39.873 --> 00:40:40.193
well.

00:40:40.532 --> 00:40:42.853
So it might just kind of be what

00:40:42.893 --> 00:40:43.215
it is.

00:40:47.771 --> 00:40:49.813
yeah and like kind of going back to

00:40:49.833 --> 00:40:52.856
what you were saying about um you

00:40:52.896 --> 00:40:54.476
mentioned that like a lot of companies

00:40:56.639 --> 00:40:58.380
they they put work into it and then

00:40:58.400 --> 00:41:00.342
they don't want people stealing that work

00:41:00.822 --> 00:41:01.884
it's one of those things where like in

00:41:01.923 --> 00:41:04.565
that case and i say this kind of

00:41:04.585 --> 00:41:05.827
spitefully but like then just don't be

00:41:05.887 --> 00:41:07.708
open source because i mean obviously in a

00:41:07.768 --> 00:41:09.190
perfect world i would prefer everything

00:41:09.269 --> 00:41:10.811
was or at very least be like you

00:41:10.831 --> 00:41:12.152
said like be transparent about being

00:41:12.213 --> 00:41:14.155
source available because um

00:41:15.224 --> 00:41:15.865
in a perfect world,

00:41:15.925 --> 00:41:17.186
I would love for everything to be at

00:41:17.226 --> 00:41:18.347
very least source available,

00:41:18.387 --> 00:41:20.208
because that's how we're able to verify

00:41:20.728 --> 00:41:22.030
that the code is doing what it's doing.

00:41:22.050 --> 00:41:24.112
And it helps build that trust at very

00:41:24.172 --> 00:41:25.492
least, I think, um,

00:41:25.552 --> 00:41:27.094
especially things that deal with security,

00:41:27.134 --> 00:41:29.596
like password managers should at very

00:41:29.635 --> 00:41:31.117
least have their cryptographic bits be

00:41:31.157 --> 00:41:33.177
source available, um, bare minimum,

00:41:33.398 --> 00:41:35.320
but cause security is something where like

00:41:35.400 --> 00:41:36.101
everyone benefits.

00:41:36.141 --> 00:41:36.360
Right.

00:41:36.420 --> 00:41:36.561
But

00:41:37.751 --> 00:41:38.092
To me,

00:41:38.112 --> 00:41:39.594
it's just such a crappy thing because

00:41:39.614 --> 00:41:40.534
that's the risk you take.

00:41:40.615 --> 00:41:42.998
And I've talked to a lot of projects

00:41:43.099 --> 00:41:44.740
that are not open source and I've asked

00:41:44.760 --> 00:41:45.021
them that.

00:41:45.041 --> 00:41:45.260
I'm like,

00:41:45.300 --> 00:41:46.782
why don't you guys have any open source

00:41:46.802 --> 00:41:47.423
clients or anything?

00:41:47.824 --> 00:41:49.005
And that's usually the number one reason

00:41:49.025 --> 00:41:49.726
they give is they're like,

00:41:49.766 --> 00:41:50.688
we're worried that people are going to

00:41:50.708 --> 00:41:52.190
take our stuff and steal it.

00:41:52.210 --> 00:41:53.612
We have no real way to control that.

00:41:55.014 --> 00:41:55.393
And then there's...

00:41:56.235 --> 00:41:57.195
to counter their argument.

00:41:57.215 --> 00:41:58.536
There are plenty of companies who seem to

00:41:58.556 --> 00:41:59.815
be doing just fine despite that.

00:42:00.277 --> 00:42:02.036
But yeah, so it's, I don't know.

00:42:02.077 --> 00:42:03.077
It's just me.

00:42:03.097 --> 00:42:03.958
I say this with a little bit of

00:42:03.978 --> 00:42:05.557
bitterness in my voice towards only

00:42:05.617 --> 00:42:05.878
office.

00:42:05.938 --> 00:42:07.259
It's like, then just don't be open source.

00:42:07.338 --> 00:42:10.199
Like it feels almost, um,

00:42:10.719 --> 00:42:12.041
it's going to be a really niche reference.

00:42:12.061 --> 00:42:13.240
And I don't think this is as much

00:42:13.260 --> 00:42:13.981
of an issue anymore,

00:42:14.402 --> 00:42:15.802
but back in like the early two thousands,

00:42:16.081 --> 00:42:17.822
um, there was a real,

00:42:17.842 --> 00:42:19.063
I don't know if you'd call it an

00:42:19.083 --> 00:42:19.483
issue or not.

00:42:19.523 --> 00:42:20.364
I guess it depends on how you feel

00:42:20.384 --> 00:42:22.724
about it, but a lot of bands would,

00:42:22.864 --> 00:42:23.005
um,

00:42:24.143 --> 00:42:25.824
would market themselves as Christian bands

00:42:25.885 --> 00:42:27.146
because the Christian market would be a

00:42:27.266 --> 00:42:28.527
lot easier to break into.

00:42:29.068 --> 00:42:30.329
And then once they hit a certain level

00:42:30.349 --> 00:42:30.909
of success,

00:42:30.989 --> 00:42:32.771
they would quote unquote go mainstream.

00:42:33.251 --> 00:42:34.152
And some of them would even like

00:42:34.192 --> 00:42:35.251
vehemently deny, like, no,

00:42:35.291 --> 00:42:36.233
we were never a Christian band.

00:42:36.253 --> 00:42:37.273
And it's like, well,

00:42:37.293 --> 00:42:39.034
we have interviews with you where you said

00:42:39.496 --> 00:42:41.137
that you were, so whatever, dude.

00:42:41.797 --> 00:42:42.458
But to me,

00:42:42.478 --> 00:42:43.338
it just feels the same way.

00:42:43.378 --> 00:42:43.579
It's like,

00:42:43.599 --> 00:42:44.780
you don't actually believe this stuff.

00:42:44.820 --> 00:42:46.121
It's just some kind of marketing gimmick.

00:42:46.760 --> 00:42:49.021
And in this case, the open source,

00:42:49.041 --> 00:42:49.882
I just feel like that, I mean,

00:42:50.021 --> 00:42:51.021
I guess in the Christian thing too,

00:42:51.442 --> 00:42:52.262
just feels kind of crappy.

00:42:52.302 --> 00:42:54.123
It's like, you know,

00:42:54.222 --> 00:42:55.623
don't say that you believe in this stuff

00:42:55.702 --> 00:42:58.364
just to get ahead in the competition,

00:42:58.423 --> 00:43:00.103
like commit to it or don't.

00:43:00.284 --> 00:43:01.103
So I don't know.

00:43:01.143 --> 00:43:06.425
That just, that really frustrates me.

00:43:06.445 --> 00:43:09.286
Quick thanks to at Sod This All for

00:43:09.326 --> 00:43:10.887
gifting a Privacy Guys membership.

00:43:10.907 --> 00:43:12.106
Thank you for your support.

00:43:15.023 --> 00:43:15.505
Oh, nice.

00:43:15.605 --> 00:43:16.204
I just saw that.

00:43:16.244 --> 00:43:16.585
Yeah.

00:43:16.945 --> 00:43:18.887
I had comments closed down so I could

00:43:19.007 --> 00:43:19.967
see the screen a little better.

00:43:20.047 --> 00:43:21.188
But yeah, thank you.

00:43:21.228 --> 00:43:21.648
That's super cool.

00:43:21.769 --> 00:43:24.030
All right.

00:43:24.110 --> 00:43:26.353
I think that'll take us into a LinkedIn

00:43:26.373 --> 00:43:28.375
story that Jonah actually alerted me to

00:43:28.394 --> 00:43:30.536
this story right before we started

00:43:30.577 --> 00:43:30.896
recording.

00:43:30.936 --> 00:43:32.197
This one's like hot off the presses.

00:43:33.135 --> 00:43:33.394
Yeah,

00:43:33.534 --> 00:43:36.157
I think this was reported just yesterday

00:43:36.197 --> 00:43:38.577
or today, if I remember correctly.

00:43:38.777 --> 00:43:42.139
I definitely saw it only yesterday,

00:43:42.179 --> 00:43:43.960
but maybe it's been talked about a bit

00:43:44.021 --> 00:43:45.161
for a while.

00:43:46.202 --> 00:43:49.083
But there's this report that LinkedIn is

00:43:49.184 --> 00:43:52.987
illegally or allegedly illegally searching

00:43:53.047 --> 00:43:53.927
your computer.

00:43:53.967 --> 00:43:55.568
They are scanning installed browser

00:43:55.608 --> 00:43:58.929
extensions without user permission.

00:44:00.362 --> 00:44:03.184
So this is reported by Apple Insider.

00:44:05.847 --> 00:44:09.389
And something is wrong with my computer.

00:44:09.449 --> 00:44:10.610
There we go.

00:44:10.630 --> 00:44:12.311
They say researchers have determined that

00:44:13.150 --> 00:44:15.413
Microsoft's LinkedIn is scanning browser

00:44:15.452 --> 00:44:17.074
plugins and other information without

00:44:17.114 --> 00:44:19.155
permission and building user profiles

00:44:19.235 --> 00:44:21.195
using data that the company did not get

00:44:21.436 --> 00:44:22.516
permission to take.

00:44:23.974 --> 00:44:26.175
A European advocacy group claims LinkedIn

00:44:26.195 --> 00:44:29.097
is probing browser extensions through its

00:44:29.137 --> 00:44:29.976
website code.

00:44:30.336 --> 00:44:34.159
Fairlinked EV published a BrowserGate

00:44:34.358 --> 00:44:37.000
report alleging LinkedIn detects installed

00:44:37.039 --> 00:44:38.860
browser extensions by probing for known

00:44:38.940 --> 00:44:40.400
identifiers through JavaScript.

00:44:40.760 --> 00:44:42.501
The group says the technique reveals

00:44:42.661 --> 00:44:45.063
personally identifiable information.

00:44:46.244 --> 00:44:47.565
And so this is a threat that we've

00:44:47.605 --> 00:44:49.226
talked about before,

00:44:49.666 --> 00:44:51.367
I think in a previous episode of this

00:44:51.407 --> 00:44:51.648
show,

00:44:51.668 --> 00:44:54.291
but definitely on the forum where the

00:44:54.331 --> 00:44:56.092
browser extensions that you install can

00:44:56.132 --> 00:44:59.295
definitely add to your browser fingerprint

00:44:59.394 --> 00:45:03.237
and can specifically identify you based on

00:45:03.297 --> 00:45:04.639
what extensions you have installed.

00:45:05.280 --> 00:45:08.380
And that's been a known threat for quite

00:45:08.400 --> 00:45:08.780
a while,

00:45:08.800 --> 00:45:09.902
but I think this is one of the

00:45:09.981 --> 00:45:13.262
first and maybe the largest examples of a

00:45:13.623 --> 00:45:16.583
real world situation where this is

00:45:16.623 --> 00:45:17.083
happening.

00:45:18.164 --> 00:45:21.865
And so if we look at this Fairlinked

00:45:23.766 --> 00:45:24.987
BrowserGate website,

00:45:25.646 --> 00:45:27.748
they point out a lot of different problems

00:45:27.847 --> 00:45:29.889
with these tools,

00:45:31.548 --> 00:45:32.369
namely that

00:45:34.590 --> 00:45:38.813
Microsoft is designated as a gatekeeper

00:45:38.954 --> 00:45:40.994
under the Digital Markets Act in the EU.

00:45:41.715 --> 00:45:44.016
So Microsoft Windows and Microsoft

00:45:44.137 --> 00:45:47.039
LinkedIn are both regulated products under

00:45:47.059 --> 00:45:50.621
the DMA, and they need to allow,

00:45:50.742 --> 00:45:52.083
as a result, free, effective,

00:45:52.123 --> 00:45:53.344
high-quality, continuous,

00:45:53.463 --> 00:45:55.425
real-time access to all data,

00:45:55.766 --> 00:45:57.706
including personal data that's generated

00:45:57.766 --> 00:45:59.708
through the use of these products,

00:46:00.228 --> 00:46:02.130
which LinkedIn is not doing because

00:46:02.150 --> 00:46:02.811
they're doing this

00:46:03.351 --> 00:46:04.070
in the background.

00:46:04.351 --> 00:46:07.693
They also point out that this search of

00:46:07.733 --> 00:46:09.655
all of your browser extensions can reveal

00:46:09.775 --> 00:46:13.777
a lot of different personal information,

00:46:13.996 --> 00:46:17.099
and they give some examples of extensions

00:46:17.378 --> 00:46:19.019
that could potentially reveal that.

00:46:19.260 --> 00:46:21.822
It could reveal your political opinions,

00:46:22.501 --> 00:46:23.161
for example,

00:46:23.862 --> 00:46:25.403
because there are extensions like

00:46:26.684 --> 00:46:28.847
anti-woke, anti-Zionist tag,

00:46:28.967 --> 00:46:31.329
no more Musk that you can install.

00:46:31.349 --> 00:46:32.632
I don't know what those extensions do,

00:46:32.672 --> 00:46:34.054
but obviously having them installed

00:46:34.594 --> 00:46:39.000
definitely shares a bit about what you

00:46:39.019 --> 00:46:39.420
believe.

00:46:39.880 --> 00:46:41.061
It could share some...

00:46:41.862 --> 00:46:43.563
Could reveal your religious beliefs

00:46:43.603 --> 00:46:45.905
because there are extensions like Porta AI

00:46:45.945 --> 00:46:49.567
which blur haram content or Dean Shield

00:46:49.586 --> 00:46:51.347
which blocks haram sites.

00:46:52.648 --> 00:46:55.289
It could reveal potential disabilities or

00:46:55.369 --> 00:46:57.150
neurodivergence through extensions you

00:46:57.170 --> 00:47:00.411
have installed like Simplify which aids

00:47:01.132 --> 00:47:02.693
neurodivergent users in browsing the

00:47:02.713 --> 00:47:03.012
internet.

00:47:05.554 --> 00:47:06.114
Certainly,

00:47:06.355 --> 00:47:09.717
LinkedIn could be getting your employment

00:47:09.777 --> 00:47:10.257
information.

00:47:10.277 --> 00:47:11.878
There's a lot of obvious ways to do

00:47:11.918 --> 00:47:12.079
that,

00:47:12.099 --> 00:47:15.561
but there are job search extensions that

00:47:15.581 --> 00:47:21.427
people use on LinkedIn where that could

00:47:21.467 --> 00:47:23.688
reveal information to LinkedIn or your

00:47:23.728 --> 00:47:24.369
current employer.

00:47:25.530 --> 00:47:28.130
And then it just reveals a lot of

00:47:28.650 --> 00:47:30.552
potential trade secrets because LinkedIn

00:47:30.632 --> 00:47:32.213
is this network where so many

00:47:32.632 --> 00:47:35.594
professionals are located and they share a

00:47:35.634 --> 00:47:38.034
ton of information about where they work

00:47:38.275 --> 00:47:39.876
and Microsoft would have access to all of

00:47:39.896 --> 00:47:41.637
that data and they would also have access

00:47:41.697 --> 00:47:43.878
to all of the extensions that these people

00:47:43.918 --> 00:47:44.757
have installed,

00:47:44.777 --> 00:47:48.860
some of which would be mandated by their

00:47:48.900 --> 00:47:49.360
companies.

00:47:49.500 --> 00:47:51.481
So like whether you use

00:47:54.159 --> 00:47:56.001
The examples that they give are Apollo,

00:47:56.101 --> 00:47:56.902
Zoom, Info.

00:47:56.963 --> 00:48:00.226
You could imagine other browser extensions

00:48:01.166 --> 00:48:03.048
of professional tools that would be

00:48:03.509 --> 00:48:04.730
installed by these companies.

00:48:08.693 --> 00:48:10.474
I don't know what tools companies use,

00:48:10.514 --> 00:48:11.076
to be honest.

00:48:11.836 --> 00:48:13.418
I know in the education space,

00:48:13.458 --> 00:48:14.918
we would use tools like GoGuardian,

00:48:14.960 --> 00:48:15.500
for example.

00:48:15.639 --> 00:48:16.000
And so...

00:48:16.840 --> 00:48:17.661
In that example,

00:48:17.842 --> 00:48:19.983
they could find out what we're using.

00:48:20.742 --> 00:48:22.244
But a similar case would apply to all

00:48:22.264 --> 00:48:24.344
of these organizations and their employees

00:48:24.364 --> 00:48:27.085
who use LinkedIn.

00:48:28.967 --> 00:48:29.766
They say,

00:48:29.887 --> 00:48:31.648
Fairlink says in their BrowserGate site

00:48:31.668 --> 00:48:33.289
that LinkedIn has not disclosed this

00:48:33.329 --> 00:48:35.230
practice in its privacy policy.

00:48:35.289 --> 00:48:37.150
There's no mention of extension scanning

00:48:37.530 --> 00:48:40.032
in any public-facing document that

00:48:40.452 --> 00:48:41.452
LinkedIn has published.

00:48:41.793 --> 00:48:43.273
And so on this BrowserGate website,

00:48:43.293 --> 00:48:45.693
which you can find at browsergate.eu,

00:48:47.094 --> 00:48:49.394
they list six thousand two hundred twenty

00:48:49.414 --> 00:48:52.416
two extensions that a hidden JavaScript

00:48:52.456 --> 00:48:56.336
program on LinkedIn will scan your browser

00:48:56.356 --> 00:48:56.597
for.

00:48:56.976 --> 00:48:59.577
I believe this only applies to Chrome

00:48:59.597 --> 00:49:00.077
browsers,

00:49:00.117 --> 00:49:02.998
but that's probably most people visiting

00:49:03.038 --> 00:49:04.179
LinkedIn, I would imagine.

00:49:06.018 --> 00:49:07.440
and you can't opt in or opt out

00:49:07.481 --> 00:49:09.403
of that and there's again no mention of

00:49:09.443 --> 00:49:11.206
any of this happening in any of their

00:49:11.246 --> 00:49:13.708
privacy policies um which is definitely

00:49:14.389 --> 00:49:16.793
very concerning um so

00:49:18.291 --> 00:49:21.873
It's kind of a mass breach of your

00:49:21.893 --> 00:49:22.675
personal data.

00:49:23.594 --> 00:49:25.757
They say that this is deceiving

00:49:25.896 --> 00:49:27.918
e-regulators, which is probably true.

00:49:28.018 --> 00:49:30.260
And so I think it's just interesting to

00:49:30.340 --> 00:49:33.324
note for sure that this definitely leads a

00:49:33.384 --> 00:49:35.184
lot of credence to the idea that your

00:49:35.204 --> 00:49:38.068
browser fingerprints are going to identify

00:49:38.108 --> 00:49:41.990
you and reveal a lot of information about

00:49:42.090 --> 00:49:42.891
you and what you do,

00:49:42.952 --> 00:49:44.932
especially when it's being done by a

00:49:44.992 --> 00:49:45.594
company like

00:49:45.873 --> 00:49:47.976
LinkedIn that has probably a lot of

00:49:48.056 --> 00:49:49.940
information about you if you use it.

00:49:49.960 --> 00:49:51.101
It has your real name.

00:49:51.521 --> 00:49:53.483
Some people ID verify on LinkedIn.

00:49:54.224 --> 00:49:56.949
They have your whole resume and being able

00:49:56.969 --> 00:49:58.972
to tie all of this digital data to

00:49:58.992 --> 00:49:59.733
those profiles.

00:50:01.152 --> 00:50:03.693
creates a very unique and very

00:50:03.733 --> 00:50:05.875
comprehensive profile of you when you use

00:50:05.894 --> 00:50:06.355
the service.

00:50:06.715 --> 00:50:09.117
So I think it is very concerning for

00:50:09.157 --> 00:50:09.376
sure.

00:50:09.396 --> 00:50:11.018
And it shows that the threats that we

00:50:11.077 --> 00:50:12.719
talk about when it comes to your privacy

00:50:12.938 --> 00:50:14.960
are in fact a real issue.

00:50:15.081 --> 00:50:18.943
And these companies are trying to get all

00:50:18.983 --> 00:50:20.284
of this data wherever they can.

00:50:24.132 --> 00:50:25.074
Yeah, for the record,

00:50:25.373 --> 00:50:27.856
I tried to show the browsergate.eu

00:50:27.896 --> 00:50:28.297
website.

00:50:28.336 --> 00:50:28.817
For some reason,

00:50:28.836 --> 00:50:31.139
it's not loading on the device.

00:50:31.360 --> 00:50:32.740
It worked fine earlier,

00:50:32.820 --> 00:50:35.083
but I guarantee it's DNS.

00:50:35.123 --> 00:50:36.143
It's always a DNS issue.

00:50:38.025 --> 00:50:39.686
But yeah, it's my first thought.

00:50:39.746 --> 00:50:41.009
OK, so my first thought,

00:50:41.088 --> 00:50:42.590
because I was recently educated,

00:50:44.110 --> 00:50:45.972
for general browser fingerprinting,

00:50:46.012 --> 00:50:46.733
like the day-to-day,

00:50:49.420 --> 00:50:51.443
Some browsers like Firefox, for example,

00:50:52.143 --> 00:50:55.465
they do actually try to obfuscate what

00:50:55.585 --> 00:50:56.947
extensions you have installed.

00:50:57.847 --> 00:51:00.530
And I guess just to back up a

00:51:00.550 --> 00:51:03.172
little further, I know that for, again,

00:51:03.211 --> 00:51:04.233
for general fingerprinting,

00:51:04.273 --> 00:51:05.614
it's not always a guarantee that having

00:51:05.653 --> 00:51:06.994
more extensions will make you more

00:51:07.014 --> 00:51:08.635
fingerprintable because it generally

00:51:08.655 --> 00:51:10.077
depends on what does the extension do and

00:51:10.117 --> 00:51:11.398
whether or not it modifies the page.

00:51:11.838 --> 00:51:13.519
But obviously this one is going out of

00:51:13.539 --> 00:51:15.061
its way to scan your extensions, right?

00:51:15.601 --> 00:51:16.503
So that's a little bit of a different

00:51:16.543 --> 00:51:16.802
story.

00:51:17.369 --> 00:51:18.909
which I would argue that general

00:51:18.949 --> 00:51:20.630
fingerprinting probably does that too.

00:51:21.230 --> 00:51:23.110
But going back to what I was saying

00:51:23.130 --> 00:51:23.769
about Firefox,

00:51:23.789 --> 00:51:27.831
I know Firefox basically tries to,

00:51:28.010 --> 00:51:29.092
and I'm probably going to get the fine

00:51:29.112 --> 00:51:30.472
details wrong on this, so I apologize,

00:51:30.831 --> 00:51:32.431
but they basically try to like randomize

00:51:32.632 --> 00:51:34.813
the ID that your extensions have to make

00:51:34.873 --> 00:51:36.092
it a little bit harder for you to

00:51:36.112 --> 00:51:36.793
be fingerprinted.

00:51:37.373 --> 00:51:38.034
Do you think that would,

00:51:39.034 --> 00:51:40.134
do you think that would stop something

00:51:40.173 --> 00:51:41.393
like this or slow it down?

00:51:41.434 --> 00:51:43.255
Or is it just going to be able

00:51:43.275 --> 00:51:44.175
to get past that anyways?

00:51:45.077 --> 00:51:49.423
um it could potentially but i mean yeah

00:51:49.925 --> 00:51:52.047
it depends on you know i'm not sure

00:51:52.068 --> 00:51:54.010
how these programs work randomizing it

00:51:54.030 --> 00:51:55.853
could work if you can't find the files

00:51:56.132 --> 00:51:58.295
in the first place um and that probably

00:51:58.396 --> 00:52:02.322
is a strong protection against it um but

00:52:04.351 --> 00:52:06.632
If those extensions modify the page

00:52:06.672 --> 00:52:08.472
itself, which a lot of extensions do,

00:52:08.492 --> 00:52:10.112
then that probably is still going to be

00:52:10.152 --> 00:52:10.693
detectable.

00:52:10.833 --> 00:52:13.353
And so that's only going to protect your

00:52:13.393 --> 00:52:15.534
privacy against certain extensions you

00:52:15.554 --> 00:52:17.855
have installed that make public resources

00:52:17.894 --> 00:52:21.617
available, but don't modify the page,

00:52:22.757 --> 00:52:25.858
which I don't think would be a ton

00:52:25.878 --> 00:52:26.797
of extensions,

00:52:28.679 --> 00:52:30.398
especially like password managers.

00:52:30.478 --> 00:52:31.619
I can imagine where...

00:52:33.034 --> 00:52:34.596
like if they edit the page itself to

00:52:34.675 --> 00:52:36.257
add like a pop up or like a

00:52:36.318 --> 00:52:37.798
drop down menu to logins,

00:52:37.878 --> 00:52:39.380
that's going to be impacted.

00:52:39.420 --> 00:52:42.483
So if you disabled all of that autofill

00:52:42.503 --> 00:52:44.605
stuff, and you kept the extension,

00:52:45.204 --> 00:52:47.726
and only like manually copied from it on

00:52:47.806 --> 00:52:49.768
certain pages, you know,

00:52:49.849 --> 00:52:51.030
it could potentially protect you in that

00:52:51.050 --> 00:52:51.490
situation.

00:52:51.510 --> 00:52:56.054
But I don't think most people are doing

00:52:56.094 --> 00:52:56.414
that.

00:52:56.875 --> 00:52:58.516
So I don't know how extensive that

00:52:58.556 --> 00:53:00.197
protection would really be.

00:53:01.650 --> 00:53:02.150
Which even then,

00:53:02.210 --> 00:53:04.012
my thought process is that kind of defeats

00:53:04.371 --> 00:53:06.253
one of the advantages of a password

00:53:06.273 --> 00:53:08.313
manager, which is if it doesn't autofill,

00:53:08.333 --> 00:53:09.614
that could be an indicator that you're on

00:53:09.635 --> 00:53:10.315
a phishing page.

00:53:10.376 --> 00:53:12.036
So if it never autofills,

00:53:12.077 --> 00:53:13.577
then you never have that moment of like,

00:53:13.617 --> 00:53:14.577
wait, am I on the right page?

00:53:14.597 --> 00:53:15.659
Yeah.

00:53:15.699 --> 00:53:16.259
Yeah.

00:53:16.398 --> 00:53:17.760
And then I guess my other thought, too,

00:53:17.840 --> 00:53:19.661
is just not really a question,

00:53:19.681 --> 00:53:20.222
but just a thought.

00:53:21.222 --> 00:53:23.804
You pointed out that this was tested on

00:53:23.864 --> 00:53:24.704
Chromium browsers,

00:53:24.764 --> 00:53:26.206
which is probably what most people are

00:53:26.226 --> 00:53:26.965
going to use anyways.

00:53:29.239 --> 00:53:31.159
I, at my last job,

00:53:31.219 --> 00:53:33.739
they gave us work computers that came with

00:53:33.780 --> 00:53:34.320
Microsoft.

00:53:35.119 --> 00:53:36.840
And I mean,

00:53:36.900 --> 00:53:38.081
ninety nine percent of what I did was

00:53:38.121 --> 00:53:39.340
logging into the company stuff anyway.

00:53:39.380 --> 00:53:40.481
So I just use Edge because that's what

00:53:40.521 --> 00:53:40.960
it came with.

00:53:41.501 --> 00:53:42.222
And at one point,

00:53:42.461 --> 00:53:43.442
I think at one point I did get

00:53:43.481 --> 00:53:45.422
Brave installed on it and then I was

00:53:45.461 --> 00:53:46.422
never able to do it again.

00:53:47.143 --> 00:53:48.762
But I think I did try Firefox because

00:53:48.782 --> 00:53:49.543
I was like, well, you know,

00:53:49.663 --> 00:53:51.443
it'll it's not Edge, right?

00:53:51.724 --> 00:53:52.923
It'll be a way bigger improvement in

00:53:52.943 --> 00:53:53.344
privacy.

00:53:54.103 --> 00:53:55.583
But I got really annoyed because

00:53:55.664 --> 00:53:57.045
everything in a corporate environment is

00:53:57.204 --> 00:53:58.105
optimized to work

00:53:59.047 --> 00:53:59.728
with Edge.

00:54:00.369 --> 00:54:02.088
And so it was just so much extra

00:54:02.128 --> 00:54:03.530
friction to use Firefox.

00:54:03.949 --> 00:54:05.309
So where I'm going with this is, yeah,

00:54:05.369 --> 00:54:06.831
like most corporate environments are

00:54:06.871 --> 00:54:09.211
probably going to be using either Chrome

00:54:09.351 --> 00:54:10.652
or Edge because everybody's familiar with

00:54:10.672 --> 00:54:10.952
Chrome.

00:54:11.012 --> 00:54:12.833
And where I was going with that is

00:54:12.932 --> 00:54:14.173
at my job, they said like, yeah,

00:54:14.213 --> 00:54:15.554
if you go to our little app store,

00:54:15.574 --> 00:54:16.833
you can download Chrome or whatever.

00:54:16.873 --> 00:54:17.375
We don't care.

00:54:17.474 --> 00:54:18.534
Use whatever browser you want.

00:54:18.974 --> 00:54:20.115
So most people are probably going to be

00:54:20.135 --> 00:54:20.896
using Chrome or Edge.

00:54:20.976 --> 00:54:22.235
Maybe some will be using Safari,

00:54:22.255 --> 00:54:23.597
which I think the article did say that

00:54:25.302 --> 00:54:25.541
Yeah,

00:54:25.561 --> 00:54:26.882
Safari users are less likely to be

00:54:26.902 --> 00:54:28.483
affected by the specific mechanism based

00:54:28.543 --> 00:54:30.224
on how extension detection typically works

00:54:30.244 --> 00:54:30.985
across browsers.

00:54:31.945 --> 00:54:33.146
Apple's browser model limits

00:54:33.387 --> 00:54:34.507
fingerprinting surfaces.

00:54:35.969 --> 00:54:38.371
But it kind of goes back to...

00:54:41.313 --> 00:54:43.393
It's unfortunate because not everything...

00:54:44.175 --> 00:54:44.434
Where am I?

00:54:44.675 --> 00:54:47.177
How am I trying to word this?

00:54:47.257 --> 00:54:48.777
It's important to try to compartmentalize

00:54:48.898 --> 00:54:50.338
your professional life and your personal

00:54:50.358 --> 00:54:50.818
life, right?

00:54:50.858 --> 00:54:51.420
Like never...

00:54:52.835 --> 00:54:54.577
Never do personal stuff on a work

00:54:54.597 --> 00:54:55.036
computer.

00:54:56.097 --> 00:54:57.277
For some reason, people do anyways,

00:54:57.297 --> 00:54:57.958
and I don't know why.

00:54:58.398 --> 00:54:58.938
But even then,

00:54:58.978 --> 00:55:00.539
LinkedIn is something that...

00:55:00.900 --> 00:55:02.061
You wouldn't get in trouble for doing that

00:55:02.081 --> 00:55:03.722
on a work computer, I would imagine,

00:55:04.442 --> 00:55:05.503
but it's also something you would do at

00:55:05.543 --> 00:55:06.103
home, right?

00:55:06.143 --> 00:55:08.385
LinkedIn is supposed to be something that

00:55:08.405 --> 00:55:10.885
follows you from job to job to job.

00:55:12.007 --> 00:55:13.847
It's not necessarily specific to that job.

00:55:14.188 --> 00:55:15.327
So it is something that I could see

00:55:15.367 --> 00:55:16.969
people checking on a home device,

00:55:17.610 --> 00:55:19.391
which is so frustrating because it's like

00:55:20.530 --> 00:55:21.231
you're trying to...

00:55:23.170 --> 00:55:23.411
I don't know.

00:55:23.451 --> 00:55:23.831
It's like,

00:55:23.891 --> 00:55:24.733
it's one of those things where like,

00:55:24.753 --> 00:55:26.034
you're not really necessarily doing

00:55:26.074 --> 00:55:27.257
anything wrong and you're still getting

00:55:27.297 --> 00:55:27.677
punished.

00:55:27.717 --> 00:55:29.099
And that's, that's super frustrating,

00:55:29.139 --> 00:55:31.884
but yeah, I guess I,

00:55:31.923 --> 00:55:33.005
I just wanted to point that out.

00:55:33.085 --> 00:55:35.728
It's, it's, yeah, I don't know for sure.

00:55:35.829 --> 00:55:37.692
I mean, a ton of people, I think,

00:55:37.992 --> 00:55:38.112
um,

00:55:40.478 --> 00:55:43.242
Their work laptop is their only computer

00:55:43.302 --> 00:55:44.943
in a lot of cases besides their phone.

00:55:45.023 --> 00:55:46.585
I think a lot of I know people

00:55:46.606 --> 00:55:47.407
in that situation.

00:55:48.748 --> 00:55:49.610
And yeah,

00:55:49.630 --> 00:55:51.472
definitely do not recommend doing that.

00:55:52.514 --> 00:55:54.876
You should get your own personal laptop

00:55:54.916 --> 00:55:55.737
and use that instead.

00:55:55.797 --> 00:55:56.858
But I know a lot of people do

00:55:56.878 --> 00:55:57.320
that anyways.

00:55:58.480 --> 00:55:59.860
Another thing that I wanted to share,

00:56:01.601 --> 00:56:02.322
not in the notes,

00:56:02.342 --> 00:56:04.864
but kind of related to this is browser

00:56:04.885 --> 00:56:07.326
extensions aren't the only ways that

00:56:07.365 --> 00:56:08.967
websites can potentially fingerprint you

00:56:09.067 --> 00:56:10.789
or like software you have installed on

00:56:10.829 --> 00:56:11.369
your computer.

00:56:11.409 --> 00:56:14.010
Sometimes the software itself on your

00:56:14.030 --> 00:56:15.572
computer can work against you.

00:56:16.652 --> 00:56:18.353
And so kind of recently,

00:56:18.434 --> 00:56:19.635
I think this has been going on for

00:56:19.655 --> 00:56:19.974
a while,

00:56:20.014 --> 00:56:22.717
but it's been picked up by some news

00:56:22.777 --> 00:56:23.297
sources.

00:56:26.277 --> 00:56:28.097
Basically, Adobe Creative Cloud,

00:56:28.137 --> 00:56:29.059
of course it's Adobe,

00:56:30.719 --> 00:56:32.862
is changing the host file on your

00:56:32.922 --> 00:56:33.402
computer,

00:56:35.163 --> 00:56:37.445
which allows websites to detect whether

00:56:37.485 --> 00:56:40.007
you have Adobe Creative Cloud installed.

00:56:40.427 --> 00:56:41.728
So this is posted to Reddit.

00:56:42.208 --> 00:56:42.648
Basically,

00:56:42.688 --> 00:56:45.391
Adobe is adding this line to your host

00:56:45.431 --> 00:56:45.771
file.

00:56:45.871 --> 00:56:48.452
And then when you visit the Adobe website,

00:56:49.092 --> 00:56:52.235
it tries loading an image from that exact

00:56:52.255 --> 00:56:52.635
domain.

00:56:52.894 --> 00:56:55.737
And if the image loads because of this

00:56:56.496 --> 00:56:58.597
line that they've added that points that

00:56:58.637 --> 00:56:59.918
domain to a specific IP,

00:57:00.239 --> 00:57:03.260
then they know that you have Creative

00:57:03.300 --> 00:57:03.940
Cloud installed.

00:57:04.021 --> 00:57:04.722
And that could, of course,

00:57:04.762 --> 00:57:06.983
be checked by any number of different

00:57:07.003 --> 00:57:08.804
websites to detect whether you have Adobe

00:57:08.844 --> 00:57:10.085
Creative Cloud installed.

00:57:10.244 --> 00:57:13.206
And so even if you don't have any

00:57:13.226 --> 00:57:13.987
browser extensions,

00:57:14.007 --> 00:57:15.947
there are other ways that software

00:57:16.668 --> 00:57:20.248
on your device itself can um increase your

00:57:20.268 --> 00:57:22.670
browser fingerprinting profile um

00:57:24.050 --> 00:57:25.650
regardless of what you do with the browser

00:57:25.710 --> 00:57:28.831
so that is something to definitely keep an

00:57:28.911 --> 00:57:30.351
eye out for because the only thing that

00:57:30.371 --> 00:57:31.811
would really protect you against this is

00:57:32.052 --> 00:57:34.472
either not letting creative cloud do this

00:57:34.512 --> 00:57:35.833
which i don't know if there's a mechanism

00:57:35.873 --> 00:57:36.853
to do that but it might be

00:57:37.914 --> 00:57:39.936
uh worth looking into or using a browser

00:57:39.976 --> 00:57:41.958
like tor browser which is going to bypass

00:57:42.117 --> 00:57:44.298
all of your local network stuff

00:57:44.318 --> 00:57:47.442
specifically but that's um challenging to

00:57:47.461 --> 00:57:48.422
do and not a lot of people are

00:57:48.443 --> 00:57:51.565
doing that for day-to-day use um and so

00:57:51.664 --> 00:57:54.206
software that does something like this um

00:57:54.628 --> 00:57:56.268
is a problem i don't know of any

00:57:56.309 --> 00:57:57.590
other software that's going to do this

00:57:57.650 --> 00:58:01.052
besides adobe but um

00:58:02.793 --> 00:58:03.474
Of course, again,

00:58:03.514 --> 00:58:06.994
of course it's Adobe doing that, but yeah,

00:58:07.014 --> 00:58:09.034
that is another attack vector unrelated to

00:58:09.074 --> 00:58:11.036
extensions that websites could be using

00:58:11.096 --> 00:58:14.117
that you'd also have to look out for.

00:58:14.137 --> 00:58:14.876
That's insane though.

00:58:14.976 --> 00:58:16.157
Editing the host file.

00:58:18.297 --> 00:58:19.639
I don't even like screwing with that.

00:58:19.679 --> 00:58:20.898
That's some deep level stuff.

00:58:22.500 --> 00:58:23.219
Oh my God.

00:58:23.559 --> 00:58:23.860
Wow.

00:58:24.079 --> 00:58:25.780
These companies are out of control, man.

00:58:26.300 --> 00:58:26.541
Yeah.

00:58:30.844 --> 00:58:31.505
My brain hurts.

00:58:31.905 --> 00:58:33.786
Just related to that, it's always DNS,

00:58:33.905 --> 00:58:34.405
right?

00:58:34.445 --> 00:58:35.766
DNS can be used against you.

00:58:35.827 --> 00:58:37.027
DNS is used for evil.

00:58:37.047 --> 00:58:39.007
Anyways,

00:58:39.027 --> 00:58:40.309
I think that's all I have to say.

00:58:40.329 --> 00:58:41.929
Do you want to talk about our next

00:58:41.949 --> 00:58:42.409
story here?

00:58:43.090 --> 00:58:43.469
Yeah.

00:58:44.291 --> 00:58:45.831
My brain is still hurting from the host

00:58:45.851 --> 00:58:47.172
file thing, so we'll just move on.

00:58:49.293 --> 00:58:50.652
So this next story,

00:58:51.213 --> 00:58:53.393
it helps if I share the actual screen.

00:58:53.454 --> 00:58:53.914
Here we go.

00:58:54.414 --> 00:58:56.315
So this next story comes from Four of

00:58:56.335 --> 00:58:56.916
War Media.

00:58:56.996 --> 00:58:57.275
It says,

00:58:57.295 --> 00:58:59.856
a secure chat app's encryption is so bad,

00:59:00.295 --> 00:59:01.896
It's quote unquote meaningless.

00:59:04.376 --> 00:59:04.836
I mean, okay,

00:59:04.856 --> 00:59:05.637
we'll go through it a little bit.

00:59:05.657 --> 00:59:08.318
So the app is called Teleguard and I've

00:59:08.358 --> 00:59:09.219
heard of it a little bit.

00:59:09.259 --> 00:59:10.478
It actually rang a bell when I read

00:59:10.539 --> 00:59:10.798
this.

00:59:12.500 --> 00:59:13.739
I really, I'm not going to lie.

00:59:13.820 --> 00:59:15.059
I really wanted a moment where I went

00:59:15.079 --> 00:59:19.240
and checked the DMs on the forum because

00:59:19.282 --> 00:59:20.981
we get a lot of projects and privacy

00:59:21.021 --> 00:59:22.161
guides that message us directly.

00:59:22.181 --> 00:59:23.003
And they're like, hey,

00:59:23.023 --> 00:59:23.983
you should recommend our product.

00:59:24.003 --> 00:59:24.762
And we always tell them like,

00:59:24.802 --> 00:59:25.782
go post on the forum.

00:59:25.802 --> 00:59:26.864
This is a community project.

00:59:26.903 --> 00:59:27.804
Let the community vet it.

00:59:28.565 --> 00:59:29.204
Um, so I,

00:59:29.244 --> 00:59:30.806
I went and checked and I thought like

00:59:30.846 --> 00:59:31.306
maybe I,

00:59:31.427 --> 00:59:32.807
I knew their name cause they messaged us,

00:59:32.847 --> 00:59:34.690
but, um, nothing like that, I guess.

00:59:34.750 --> 00:59:36.311
So I don't know where I've heard it

00:59:36.331 --> 00:59:37.211
from, but, um,

00:59:37.251 --> 00:59:38.492
it has been mentioned on the forum once

00:59:38.532 --> 00:59:38.873
or twice,

00:59:38.893 --> 00:59:40.494
but never really like heavily recommended

00:59:40.534 --> 00:59:41.014
or anything.

00:59:41.114 --> 00:59:42.076
Just, I don't know.

00:59:42.556 --> 00:59:42.916
But either way.

00:59:42.956 --> 00:59:43.177
Yeah.

00:59:43.237 --> 00:59:44.898
So this is an app that markets itself

00:59:44.918 --> 00:59:47.260
as a secure end to end encrypted messaging

00:59:47.280 --> 00:59:47.760
platform.

00:59:48.141 --> 00:59:49.541
It's been downloaded at least a million

00:59:49.581 --> 00:59:50.001
times.

00:59:50.663 --> 00:59:53.164
Um, but apparently this researcher, uh,

00:59:53.907 --> 00:59:55.268
found, it says there's no storage,

00:59:55.309 --> 00:59:59.030
highly encrypted, highly encrypted, um,

00:59:59.050 --> 01:00:00.231
kind of like military grade encryption,

01:00:00.291 --> 01:00:00.472
right?

01:00:01.012 --> 01:00:02.373
Anyways, um, Swiss made,

01:00:02.913 --> 01:00:04.594
and there's an anonymous researcher in

01:00:04.614 --> 01:00:06.014
March who contacted four Oh four.

01:00:06.175 --> 01:00:08.496
They said that the private encryption keys

01:00:08.876 --> 01:00:10.498
are sent to the company server upon

01:00:10.518 --> 01:00:11.378
account registration.

01:00:11.978 --> 01:00:13.099
And, um,

01:00:13.139 --> 01:00:14.380
Jonah can correct me if I'm wrong about

01:00:14.420 --> 01:00:15.300
any of this, cause I'm,

01:00:15.380 --> 01:00:16.942
I'm speaking a little bit outside my

01:00:16.981 --> 01:00:17.983
element here, but I think I'm,

01:00:18.182 --> 01:00:18.943
I'm right about this.

01:00:19.684 --> 01:00:21.625
Um, there are services like proton,

01:00:21.664 --> 01:00:23.686
for example, that, um,

01:00:24.487 --> 01:00:25.547
I don't know if I'd say the private

01:00:25.568 --> 01:00:26.628
key gets sent to the server,

01:00:26.969 --> 01:00:28.188
but they do have a way where like

01:00:28.228 --> 01:00:29.469
you can log in from any device and

01:00:29.489 --> 01:00:30.630
your email is decrypted.

01:00:30.690 --> 01:00:30.909
Right.

01:00:31.730 --> 01:00:33.431
But they also store that in such a

01:00:33.471 --> 01:00:35.072
way where they don't really get the key

01:00:35.112 --> 01:00:35.751
itself.

01:00:35.771 --> 01:00:37.532
Um, I, again,

01:00:37.592 --> 01:00:38.713
I could have the details wrong here,

01:00:38.753 --> 01:00:39.452
but my point being like,

01:00:39.552 --> 01:00:42.054
I think there is a way to store

01:00:42.094 --> 01:00:42.893
private keys,

01:00:43.934 --> 01:00:45.394
but they weren't doing it this way.

01:00:45.474 --> 01:00:46.574
They weren't doing it in a way where

01:00:46.594 --> 01:00:46.815
it's like,

01:00:46.856 --> 01:00:48.115
we don't have access to your private key.

01:00:48.155 --> 01:00:50.637
Like, no, they just had your private keys.

01:00:50.896 --> 01:00:51.056
Um,

01:00:52.355 --> 01:00:53.576
So yeah, they also...

01:00:54.677 --> 01:00:55.679
I think it's further down.

01:00:56.239 --> 01:00:57.960
They go through every single issue they

01:00:58.001 --> 01:00:58.222
found,

01:00:58.262 --> 01:01:00.224
which is basically like your private key

01:01:00.244 --> 01:01:02.126
was derived from your user ID.

01:01:02.326 --> 01:01:04.668
So anybody who had your user ID could

01:01:04.708 --> 01:01:06.550
plug it into this API and decrypt your

01:01:06.570 --> 01:01:09.393
messages, which is anybody you message.

01:01:09.875 --> 01:01:11.896
Or a lot of people will post their...

01:01:12.958 --> 01:01:13.918
Well, Signal, for example,

01:01:13.938 --> 01:01:14.980
but a lot of people will post their

01:01:15.019 --> 01:01:16.240
username publicly because they're like,

01:01:16.280 --> 01:01:17.563
hey, anybody who wants to contact me,

01:01:17.603 --> 01:01:18.023
go ahead.

01:01:19.023 --> 01:01:20.746
They said further down that metadata was

01:01:20.786 --> 01:01:21.827
stored in plain text.

01:01:21.967 --> 01:01:25.030
So basically every single mistake you

01:01:25.050 --> 01:01:28.432
could possibly imagine a company doing or

01:01:28.452 --> 01:01:29.253
a messenger doing,

01:01:29.313 --> 01:01:30.375
it seems like they were doing.

01:01:30.514 --> 01:01:32.657
And oh, man, hold on.

01:01:32.737 --> 01:01:33.597
I do have to find...

01:01:36.041 --> 01:01:36.260
Yeah.

01:01:36.601 --> 01:01:38.722
So the CEO, after publication,

01:01:38.782 --> 01:01:40.922
the CEO contacted four Oh four via

01:01:40.983 --> 01:01:41.422
LinkedIn,

01:01:42.123 --> 01:01:43.983
hopefully from a company computer in a

01:01:44.003 --> 01:01:46.005
direct message and said, quote, this,

01:01:46.304 --> 01:01:47.525
the information is incorrect.

01:01:47.626 --> 01:01:48.266
Exclamation point.

01:01:48.326 --> 01:01:49.507
The person who gave you the technical

01:01:49.726 --> 01:01:51.246
information that has completely misled

01:01:51.266 --> 01:01:51.407
you.

01:01:51.668 --> 01:01:52.807
That person is not competent.

01:01:52.967 --> 01:01:53.708
Exclamation point.

01:01:54.208 --> 01:01:54.289
Uh,

01:01:54.309 --> 01:01:55.909
the CEO did not provide any evidence for

01:01:55.949 --> 01:01:57.269
this or point to any specifics.

01:01:57.929 --> 01:01:59.271
Um, very.

01:01:59.931 --> 01:02:00.130
Yeah.

01:02:00.271 --> 01:02:00.871
I don't know.

01:02:00.891 --> 01:02:01.931
I always like when people do that kind

01:02:01.972 --> 01:02:02.492
of stuff.

01:02:02.532 --> 01:02:03.112
Very professional.

01:02:04.273 --> 01:02:04.333
Um,

01:02:04.972 --> 01:02:05.911
So is my making fun of them,

01:02:05.952 --> 01:02:06.333
but whatever.

01:02:07.972 --> 01:02:08.974
So yeah, I personally,

01:02:09.094 --> 01:02:10.534
I wanted to share this story because I

01:02:10.554 --> 01:02:12.034
feel like in the privacy community in

01:02:12.094 --> 01:02:12.474
general,

01:02:13.175 --> 01:02:17.637
I see a lot of people who I

01:02:17.657 --> 01:02:17.878
think...

01:02:18.829 --> 01:02:20.449
we get excited about new projects.

01:02:21.311 --> 01:02:22.371
I think there's two kinds of privacy

01:02:22.391 --> 01:02:22.592
people.

01:02:22.652 --> 01:02:23.672
I think there's the people who get excited

01:02:23.693 --> 01:02:24.793
about new projects and the people who are

01:02:24.833 --> 01:02:25.974
suspicious of anything new.

01:02:27.056 --> 01:02:28.177
But I see a lot of people who

01:02:28.197 --> 01:02:30.259
get excited about new projects and they're

01:02:30.298 --> 01:02:31.380
constantly like, oh,

01:02:31.400 --> 01:02:32.681
there's this new messenger I just heard

01:02:32.721 --> 01:02:32.900
about.

01:02:32.940 --> 01:02:33.742
I'm excited to try it.

01:02:33.782 --> 01:02:34.603
What does everybody think?

01:02:34.922 --> 01:02:35.483
And first of all,

01:02:35.503 --> 01:02:37.144
I think that's really awesome when you go

01:02:37.184 --> 01:02:38.385
to other members of the community.

01:02:38.585 --> 01:02:39.206
What do people think?

01:02:39.887 --> 01:02:41.907
And because I have seen one of the

01:02:41.967 --> 01:02:44.090
messages that I mentioned when I was

01:02:44.110 --> 01:02:45.030
trying to figure out where I've heard of

01:02:45.050 --> 01:02:45.710
this app before.

01:02:46.751 --> 01:02:47.891
I went to the privacy guides forum and

01:02:47.972 --> 01:02:49.213
one person was asking like, hey,

01:02:49.233 --> 01:02:50.152
what does everybody think of this?

01:02:50.594 --> 01:02:51.634
And a lot of people were like, oh,

01:02:51.653 --> 01:02:52.574
it's proprietary.

01:02:52.655 --> 01:02:53.655
Like this seems weird.

01:02:53.715 --> 01:02:54.516
This seems weird.

01:02:54.835 --> 01:02:56.197
There's a lot of red flags here.

01:02:57.057 --> 01:02:58.297
I don't think anybody did like an actual

01:02:58.378 --> 01:03:00.039
technical analysis like this person did.

01:03:00.099 --> 01:03:01.119
But, you know,

01:03:01.159 --> 01:03:02.501
it's good to get that kind of feedback

01:03:02.561 --> 01:03:03.702
from other people.

01:03:03.762 --> 01:03:04.922
Like I'm very open about the fact that

01:03:05.003 --> 01:03:07.384
I don't really know a lot of code.

01:03:07.583 --> 01:03:08.085
I did take a...

01:03:09.208 --> 01:03:10.710
There's a little app that kind of gamifies

01:03:10.730 --> 01:03:12.309
learning code, kind of like Duolingo does.

01:03:12.389 --> 01:03:13.731
And allegedly it taught me Python,

01:03:13.751 --> 01:03:15.010
but I wouldn't trust me to code anything

01:03:15.030 --> 01:03:15.931
in Python if I were you.

01:03:16.592 --> 01:03:17.952
I can now look at Python and recognize

01:03:17.972 --> 01:03:18.913
it as Python, basically.

01:03:19.353 --> 01:03:21.054
So that said, like,

01:03:21.153 --> 01:03:22.233
I think it's really good to,

01:03:23.114 --> 01:03:24.414
in my case, you know, like, hey,

01:03:24.554 --> 01:03:25.876
I don't know enough about code to

01:03:25.956 --> 01:03:26.496
understand this.

01:03:26.536 --> 01:03:28.217
Can anybody else weigh in on this?

01:03:29.356 --> 01:03:30.217
That's a really good thing.

01:03:30.257 --> 01:03:32.679
But I think it's just this...

01:03:34.777 --> 01:03:36.038
be a little bit cautious, right?

01:03:36.458 --> 01:03:37.898
There's a fine line because on the one

01:03:37.918 --> 01:03:39.460
hand, if we never trust anything new,

01:03:39.980 --> 01:03:42.380
we would never have any mass adoption of

01:03:42.400 --> 01:03:44.300
all these great tools like Proton, Intuda,

01:03:44.820 --> 01:03:45.902
Signal, SimpleX.

01:03:46.521 --> 01:03:47.942
All these really good tools would never

01:03:47.981 --> 01:03:50.322
get out of the small phase because nobody

01:03:50.342 --> 01:03:51.043
would ever trust them.

01:03:51.483 --> 01:03:52.244
But at the same time,

01:03:52.284 --> 01:03:54.443
we have seen so many apps that shut

01:03:54.463 --> 01:03:55.385
down, sold.

01:03:56.105 --> 01:03:56.724
Every once in a while,

01:03:56.744 --> 01:03:57.945
it does turn out to be a honeypot.

01:03:58.184 --> 01:04:01.547
And so there's a very fine line between

01:04:01.567 --> 01:04:02.166
these things.

01:04:02.347 --> 01:04:02.887
And-

01:04:03.567 --> 01:04:04.751
Yeah, I would also ask,

01:04:04.791 --> 01:04:06.197
especially with chat messengers,

01:04:07.300 --> 01:04:08.485
one of my personal beefs is I feel

01:04:08.505 --> 01:04:08.927
like there's

01:04:09.918 --> 01:04:11.557
an obnoxious amount of messengers.

01:04:11.757 --> 01:04:13.478
And one of the questions I always ask

01:04:13.498 --> 01:04:15.039
with any new product, not just messengers,

01:04:15.059 --> 01:04:16.759
but any new product is what are you

01:04:16.838 --> 01:04:17.179
solving?

01:04:17.458 --> 01:04:19.039
Like people send me links all the time

01:04:19.059 --> 01:04:20.420
and they're like, this looks really cool.

01:04:20.460 --> 01:04:21.599
And I'm like, okay, what is it doing?

01:04:22.079 --> 01:04:22.780
What is it solving?

01:04:22.840 --> 01:04:24.360
What problem is this solving that,

01:04:25.240 --> 01:04:26.320
you know, whether it's a search engine,

01:04:26.340 --> 01:04:28.041
an email provider, whatever,

01:04:28.101 --> 01:04:30.121
like what is it doing that this existing

01:04:30.282 --> 01:04:31.382
tool doesn't already do?

01:04:31.742 --> 01:04:32.943
And I'd say about half the time people

01:04:32.963 --> 01:04:33.802
are like, oh, I don't know.

01:04:33.943 --> 01:04:34.143
I just,

01:04:34.282 --> 01:04:35.262
I saw it and thought it was cool.

01:04:37.081 --> 01:04:38.463
it's gotta be solving a problem for me

01:04:38.503 --> 01:04:40.782
personally, but yeah.

01:04:40.822 --> 01:04:42.583
So, um, I don't know.

01:04:42.623 --> 01:04:43.724
Did you have any thoughts on this?

01:04:43.804 --> 01:04:44.045
I know,

01:04:44.144 --> 01:04:46.846
I think this one may have gone below

01:04:46.865 --> 01:04:47.726
your radar a little bit,

01:04:47.766 --> 01:04:48.746
but did you have any thoughts about it?

01:04:49.347 --> 01:04:49.746
Yeah.

01:04:50.067 --> 01:04:51.487
Um, yeah,

01:04:51.507 --> 01:04:53.047
I think that's all a good takeaway.

01:04:53.327 --> 01:04:53.447
Um,

01:04:53.487 --> 01:04:55.648
thankfully the only thing I would say is

01:04:55.708 --> 01:04:57.570
in the case of teleguards specifically,

01:04:57.949 --> 01:04:59.010
um,

01:04:59.030 --> 01:05:00.570
thankfully we've known about some of the

01:05:00.610 --> 01:05:01.652
issues with it for a while.

01:05:01.751 --> 01:05:02.771
I know that they note at the end

01:05:02.811 --> 01:05:04.072
of this article, um,

01:05:05.313 --> 01:05:08.396
TeleGuard handed over information to the

01:05:08.536 --> 01:05:11.958
FBI in around,

01:05:11.978 --> 01:05:13.320
according to the Washington Post.

01:05:14.780 --> 01:05:17.643
That article was shared on our forum and

01:05:17.684 --> 01:05:19.405
in all of the posts where TeleGuard is

01:05:19.644 --> 01:05:21.226
brought up or in the thread about

01:05:21.266 --> 01:05:22.086
TeleGuard itself.

01:05:24.289 --> 01:05:25.590
People have known for a while that they

01:05:25.610 --> 01:05:27.791
can provide information like the push

01:05:27.831 --> 01:05:31.494
notification tokens and other information

01:05:31.534 --> 01:05:32.775
and hopefully are avoiding that.

01:05:32.856 --> 01:05:34.717
But yeah,

01:05:34.878 --> 01:05:38.061
it's definitely a good thing to keep in

01:05:38.101 --> 01:05:39.181
mind because there is a balance,

01:05:39.202 --> 01:05:39.641
like you said.

01:05:39.681 --> 01:05:43.085
We do need to have more products in

01:05:43.144 --> 01:05:43.865
this space,

01:05:44.326 --> 01:05:47.489
but knowing whether they work well is...

01:05:49.032 --> 01:05:49.653
kind of tricky.

01:05:50.556 --> 01:05:52.121
And it's always good to keep an eye

01:05:52.141 --> 01:05:54.067
on this stuff because they certainly do

01:05:54.106 --> 01:05:55.552
not always work the way that they

01:05:56.605 --> 01:05:59.346
market themselves for sure.

01:05:59.746 --> 01:06:01.367
I wasn't aware until I just read this

01:06:01.427 --> 01:06:03.047
article that it was made by Swiss cows.

01:06:03.108 --> 01:06:04.909
I've heard a lot of, well,

01:06:04.949 --> 01:06:05.648
not a lot,

01:06:05.708 --> 01:06:08.110
but I've heard their search engine brought

01:06:08.210 --> 01:06:09.170
up a few times.

01:06:09.251 --> 01:06:10.391
I know that they also have a file

01:06:10.431 --> 01:06:11.130
storage service,

01:06:11.150 --> 01:06:12.831
which is as far as I know,

01:06:12.851 --> 01:06:15.072
just based on next cloud and uses like

01:06:15.092 --> 01:06:16.534
the next cloud end to end encryption,

01:06:16.554 --> 01:06:17.994
which isn't the best.

01:06:19.094 --> 01:06:20.394
So they kind of just seem to be

01:06:20.496 --> 01:06:20.835
one of the,

01:06:21.795 --> 01:06:26.360
one of those companies where um they're

01:06:26.380 --> 01:06:28.101
just putting stuff out there probably with

01:06:28.201 --> 01:06:32.164
open source tools without really um adding

01:06:32.204 --> 01:06:34.485
too much or changing it i don't know

01:06:34.585 --> 01:06:37.869
if telegard is its own homebrew product i

01:06:37.889 --> 01:06:39.309
would imagine it is because i don't know

01:06:39.349 --> 01:06:41.010
of any like open source stuff that would

01:06:41.050 --> 01:06:42.072
be um

01:06:43.891 --> 01:06:45.931
that would have this poor encryption,

01:06:46.391 --> 01:06:48.331
at least the people who are like forking

01:06:48.992 --> 01:06:50.172
element, for example,

01:06:51.612 --> 01:06:54.333
are getting a reasonably decent encryption

01:06:54.413 --> 01:06:55.092
implementation,

01:06:55.132 --> 01:06:57.293
whereas I don't know what's going on with

01:06:57.333 --> 01:06:57.813
teleguard.

01:07:00.114 --> 01:07:01.135
But yeah,

01:07:02.175 --> 01:07:03.795
I think I think in this specific case,

01:07:03.815 --> 01:07:05.394
people already know not to use it.

01:07:05.976 --> 01:07:09.376
And otherwise,

01:07:09.635 --> 01:07:10.717
with with stuff not like this,

01:07:10.757 --> 01:07:12.556
it's it's everything you said for sure.

01:07:15.802 --> 01:07:17.943
Yeah, I looked into Swiss cows briefly,

01:07:18.143 --> 01:07:19.443
I think the only thing it has going

01:07:19.463 --> 01:07:20.764
for it is it says,

01:07:21.244 --> 01:07:22.085
like the search engine.

01:07:22.585 --> 01:07:26.007
It says that it will censor adult content,

01:07:26.128 --> 01:07:28.068
which I think could be useful if you

01:07:28.108 --> 01:07:29.250
have really young kids,

01:07:30.309 --> 01:07:31.710
just as like one of those layers of

01:07:31.751 --> 01:07:32.532
defense, you know,

01:07:32.552 --> 01:07:33.972
maybe set that as the default search

01:07:34.032 --> 01:07:36.094
engine on the family computer and

01:07:36.974 --> 01:07:38.596
But then we get into the whole topic

01:07:38.635 --> 01:07:38.876
of like,

01:07:38.896 --> 01:07:40.538
at what point is it appropriate to kind

01:07:40.577 --> 01:07:41.938
of transition your kids off that?

01:07:42.018 --> 01:07:43.380
But I don't know.

01:07:43.460 --> 01:07:44.641
I remember when I looked into it,

01:07:44.661 --> 01:07:45.802
that was kind of the only advantage I

01:07:45.844 --> 01:07:46.784
saw was like, okay,

01:07:47.224 --> 01:07:48.326
I could see this if I had young

01:07:48.365 --> 01:07:49.567
kids and I just wanted it as one

01:07:49.606 --> 01:07:51.028
more layer of defense of like,

01:07:51.467 --> 01:07:52.768
I don't want them to accidentally find

01:07:52.788 --> 01:07:53.889
their way onto something bad.

01:07:53.989 --> 01:07:55.088
But yeah, of course,

01:07:55.128 --> 01:07:57.650
for for immediate does note that Teleguard

01:07:57.829 --> 01:08:01.871
has a reputation of being linked to cam

01:08:01.911 --> 01:08:05.431
models and child abusers at the end of

01:08:05.452 --> 01:08:05.992
this article.

01:08:06.012 --> 01:08:08.851
So how much I would trust their approach

01:08:08.871 --> 01:08:09.652
to child safety,

01:08:09.693 --> 01:08:11.632
it probably would not be that far.

01:08:11.813 --> 01:08:14.034
But yeah, in general,

01:08:14.054 --> 01:08:16.453
it's probably a good idea for companies to

01:08:16.493 --> 01:08:18.135
be a bit more thoughtful about all of

01:08:18.154 --> 01:08:18.635
that stuff.

01:08:20.310 --> 01:08:20.989
Yeah, that's fair.

01:08:21.270 --> 01:08:22.470
I, I don't know.

01:08:22.570 --> 01:08:23.431
I trust four Oh four,

01:08:23.471 --> 01:08:24.112
but I'm not going to lie.

01:08:24.131 --> 01:08:24.912
When I read that part,

01:08:24.953 --> 01:08:26.154
my brain kind of went to like,

01:08:27.854 --> 01:08:29.815
I wonder how much Teleguard does get used

01:08:29.855 --> 01:08:30.496
for that stuff.

01:08:30.877 --> 01:08:31.197
I don't know.

01:08:32.480 --> 01:08:32.720
Yeah,

01:08:32.761 --> 01:08:34.662
maybe if you turn a blind eye to

01:08:34.682 --> 01:08:34.783
it.

01:08:34.823 --> 01:08:37.465
I don't know how much they market it,

01:08:37.564 --> 01:08:42.529
but I know that Kik had this reputation.

01:08:42.828 --> 01:08:44.010
Maybe it still does, I don't know.

01:08:45.251 --> 01:08:46.412
It does with me, that's for sure.

01:08:46.832 --> 01:08:47.493
Yeah,

01:08:47.533 --> 01:08:48.934
I've definitely heard this about various

01:08:49.533 --> 01:08:52.155
messaging apps to the point where it seems

01:08:52.216 --> 01:08:52.716
to be...

01:08:53.216 --> 01:08:54.917
If you have that reputation and it

01:08:55.219 --> 01:08:55.679
remains,

01:08:55.719 --> 01:08:57.539
it seems to be kind of intentional,

01:08:57.579 --> 01:08:58.720
and if it's on the radar...

01:08:59.921 --> 01:09:01.462
Of these officers saying that they're

01:09:01.502 --> 01:09:02.783
notorious for it,

01:09:03.805 --> 01:09:04.985
that is a bit of a red flag.

01:09:05.445 --> 01:09:07.006
Of course, with law enforcement,

01:09:07.027 --> 01:09:08.408
it can always go either way because a

01:09:08.707 --> 01:09:10.930
lot of law enforcement officers will say

01:09:11.430 --> 01:09:12.930
Drive Fina OS, for example,

01:09:12.990 --> 01:09:15.171
is notorious for being used by criminals

01:09:15.231 --> 01:09:17.694
when in reality it's just a security tool.

01:09:19.314 --> 01:09:21.936
But seeing as how this chat app doesn't

01:09:21.957 --> 01:09:24.137
seem to provide adequate security,

01:09:26.560 --> 01:09:27.980
I don't think it's the same sort of

01:09:28.020 --> 01:09:28.621
situation.

01:09:30.481 --> 01:09:30.721
Yeah.

01:09:30.841 --> 01:09:31.943
Which not to get off topic,

01:09:31.962 --> 01:09:33.042
but I know I've said in the past,

01:09:33.103 --> 01:09:33.323
like,

01:09:33.563 --> 01:09:34.724
cause there was that story about a year

01:09:34.764 --> 01:09:37.444
or two ago about, um, apparently in Spain,

01:09:37.543 --> 01:09:40.005
just having a pixel phone automatically

01:09:40.024 --> 01:09:40.824
makes you suspicious,

01:09:40.864 --> 01:09:42.645
like maybe not legally, but in practice,

01:09:42.706 --> 01:09:45.506
it makes you suspicious because the only

01:09:45.546 --> 01:09:48.408
people in Spain that have pixels are drug

01:09:48.427 --> 01:09:49.568
dealers using graphene.

01:09:50.387 --> 01:09:52.408
Um, and so it's the,

01:09:52.488 --> 01:09:54.069
my argument when we covered that story

01:09:54.289 --> 01:09:55.210
back then was like,

01:09:55.729 --> 01:09:57.430
this is why we need to normalize tools,

01:09:57.610 --> 01:09:58.430
uh, privacy tools,

01:09:58.470 --> 01:09:58.871
because

01:09:59.460 --> 01:10:01.619
if the only people using Signal are,

01:10:02.740 --> 01:10:03.780
not that they're doing anything wrong,

01:10:03.820 --> 01:10:04.140
of course,

01:10:04.180 --> 01:10:06.541
but like dissidents and drug dealers,

01:10:06.680 --> 01:10:08.181
then like it becomes like, oh,

01:10:08.601 --> 01:10:09.282
you're on Signal,

01:10:09.322 --> 01:10:10.462
you have something to hide, which,

01:10:10.481 --> 01:10:10.742
you know,

01:10:10.822 --> 01:10:12.143
in some countries being a dissident is

01:10:12.162 --> 01:10:12.542
illegal.

01:10:12.582 --> 01:10:14.382
So my point is I'm not trying to

01:10:14.422 --> 01:10:15.682
morally group them into the same thing,

01:10:15.703 --> 01:10:16.182
but my point,

01:10:16.724 --> 01:10:18.104
it becomes something suspicious.

01:10:18.144 --> 01:10:20.283
Whereas like if my stepdad is using

01:10:20.323 --> 01:10:22.364
Signal, probably does not know what it is.

01:10:22.564 --> 01:10:23.545
I had to download it and put it

01:10:23.564 --> 01:10:24.524
on his phone and set it up for

01:10:24.545 --> 01:10:25.744
him and get him in the family chat.

01:10:26.024 --> 01:10:27.145
He didn't even know it could do video

01:10:27.326 --> 01:10:28.345
or voice calls.

01:10:29.006 --> 01:10:29.947
I tried to call him on it one

01:10:29.987 --> 01:10:31.046
time and he didn't pick up.

01:10:31.067 --> 01:10:32.167
So I called him on the regular phone

01:10:32.186 --> 01:10:32.507
and he's like,

01:10:33.007 --> 01:10:34.028
did you just try to call me on

01:10:34.087 --> 01:10:34.387
signal?

01:10:34.408 --> 01:10:35.448
I'm like, yeah, it does voice calls.

01:10:35.469 --> 01:10:37.569
He's like, oh, I didn't know that.

01:10:37.630 --> 01:10:37.750
So,

01:10:38.050 --> 01:10:39.791
but my point being like when everybody's

01:10:39.890 --> 01:10:40.190
using it,

01:10:40.251 --> 01:10:41.470
then it takes away from that stigma

01:10:41.511 --> 01:10:42.692
because they can't point to it and be

01:10:42.712 --> 01:10:43.171
like, oh,

01:10:43.572 --> 01:10:44.932
only bad people are using signal.

01:10:45.493 --> 01:10:45.853
Really?

01:10:46.453 --> 01:10:46.814
Really?

01:10:47.373 --> 01:10:48.413
My seventy year old stepdad,

01:10:48.434 --> 01:10:49.494
you think is running drugs from the

01:10:49.515 --> 01:10:49.774
border?

01:10:50.414 --> 01:10:51.416
Come on.

01:10:51.456 --> 01:10:53.417
So anyways, yeah,

01:10:53.476 --> 01:10:54.737
I just I know that's a little off

01:10:54.777 --> 01:10:55.077
topic,

01:10:55.136 --> 01:10:56.377
but I always feel the need to say

01:10:56.398 --> 01:10:56.518
that.

01:10:59.286 --> 01:11:03.059
So I think that'll take us into forum

01:11:03.118 --> 01:11:05.787
updates if I remember correctly.

01:11:06.500 --> 01:11:08.282
Yeah, well, in a minute, everyone,

01:11:08.341 --> 01:11:09.662
we're going to start taking viewer

01:11:09.722 --> 01:11:10.143
questions.

01:11:10.182 --> 01:11:10.502
Of course,

01:11:10.523 --> 01:11:11.764
you can always leave them in the chat

01:11:11.823 --> 01:11:12.284
anytime.

01:11:12.625 --> 01:11:13.845
But if you've been holding on to any

01:11:13.886 --> 01:11:15.506
questions about any of these stories that

01:11:15.527 --> 01:11:18.248
we've talked about so far, go ahead,

01:11:18.288 --> 01:11:20.490
start leaving them now here in the chat

01:11:20.551 --> 01:11:24.054
or in the forum thread for this live

01:11:24.073 --> 01:11:25.694
stream.

01:11:25.755 --> 01:11:26.636
Otherwise, yeah,

01:11:26.735 --> 01:11:27.997
let's check it on the community forum.

01:11:28.176 --> 01:11:29.837
There's always a lot of activity on the

01:11:29.858 --> 01:11:30.599
forum every week,

01:11:30.618 --> 01:11:31.520
so you should always check it out.

01:11:31.600 --> 01:11:34.082
But here's a couple discussions that we

01:11:34.141 --> 01:11:34.202
had

01:11:34.841 --> 01:11:36.722
wanted to highlight from this week.

01:11:37.162 --> 01:11:40.804
The first one is here about Russia's

01:11:41.163 --> 01:11:42.043
internet blocks.

01:11:42.203 --> 01:11:48.865
Let me get this pulled up.

01:11:48.886 --> 01:11:50.525
This was just a discussion on a New

01:11:50.565 --> 01:11:54.186
York Times piece which talked about

01:11:54.306 --> 01:11:57.028
Russian internet restrictions and how

01:11:57.068 --> 01:11:58.408
Russians are evading them.

01:11:58.448 --> 01:11:59.747
So it's a bit of a cat and

01:11:59.787 --> 01:12:00.969
mouse game there.

01:12:05.765 --> 01:12:09.487
So the person who posted this said,

01:12:09.747 --> 01:12:11.347
as some background, since early March,

01:12:11.448 --> 01:12:12.068
Moscow and St.

01:12:12.108 --> 01:12:13.868
Petersburg have experienced widespread

01:12:13.929 --> 01:12:15.210
mobile internet blackouts,

01:12:15.270 --> 01:12:16.130
not just blocked apps,

01:12:16.189 --> 01:12:18.110
but full mobile data shutdowns.

01:12:18.631 --> 01:12:20.353
Telegram is reportedly being blocked

01:12:20.453 --> 01:12:21.853
entirely starting in April.

01:12:21.893 --> 01:12:24.175
The government regulators now have the

01:12:24.215 --> 01:12:26.315
authority to disconnect Russia from the

01:12:26.355 --> 01:12:28.077
global internet entirely.

01:12:28.176 --> 01:12:29.978
And some regions of Russia are on

01:12:29.997 --> 01:12:30.337
lockdown.

01:12:30.537 --> 01:12:32.599
whitelist mode meaning everything on the

01:12:32.658 --> 01:12:34.701
internet is blocked except state-approved

01:12:34.720 --> 01:12:37.422
services like yandex and government

01:12:37.743 --> 01:12:42.426
portals um so yeah this version was

01:12:42.506 --> 01:12:44.146
interested in whether or not there's a way

01:12:44.186 --> 01:12:47.109
around this government censorship um which

01:12:47.149 --> 01:12:49.451
could expand to europe and north america

01:12:50.796 --> 01:12:52.657
The whitelisting situation,

01:12:54.617 --> 01:12:56.358
that is pretty tricky because that's going

01:12:56.377 --> 01:12:59.259
to block even the ability to use Tor

01:12:59.899 --> 01:13:02.220
bridges, for example.

01:13:02.920 --> 01:13:06.501
I know that Tor bridges are probably the

01:13:06.541 --> 01:13:08.261
best way to get around censorship,

01:13:08.801 --> 01:13:10.002
but if you're in a full whitelist

01:13:10.042 --> 01:13:12.082
situation, that may not work.

01:13:12.983 --> 01:13:13.643
At the end of the day,

01:13:13.903 --> 01:13:15.463
if your internet service provider isn't

01:13:15.484 --> 01:13:18.585
going to allow you to make any sort

01:13:18.625 --> 01:13:19.305
of connections,

01:13:22.520 --> 01:13:24.201
There isn't much you can do about that

01:13:24.661 --> 01:13:26.442
besides find an entirely alternative

01:13:26.502 --> 01:13:26.902
network.

01:13:26.962 --> 01:13:30.524
So people in this thread note that Russian

01:13:30.564 --> 01:13:32.985
citizens have started using Meshtastic to

01:13:33.006 --> 01:13:33.605
communicate,

01:13:34.386 --> 01:13:35.947
which is a decentralized network that

01:13:36.087 --> 01:13:37.547
doesn't use the internet at all.

01:13:37.627 --> 01:13:41.210
It uses LoRa radios,

01:13:42.490 --> 01:13:43.792
which are small devices that you can

01:13:43.832 --> 01:13:45.292
connect to your phone to communicate,

01:13:45.332 --> 01:13:47.993
but they have very limited range,

01:13:48.094 --> 01:13:50.475
although you can set up a mesh with

01:13:50.494 --> 01:13:50.694
them.

01:13:54.194 --> 01:13:56.797
There's probably other solutions,

01:13:56.818 --> 01:13:57.920
but I think, yeah,

01:13:59.801 --> 01:14:01.524
there's probably not too much you could do

01:14:01.543 --> 01:14:05.630
from a technical perspective here that I

01:14:05.649 --> 01:14:06.189
can think of.

01:14:06.751 --> 01:14:08.372
Was there anything in this form that you

01:14:08.412 --> 01:14:09.774
wanted to highlight specifically?

01:14:11.960 --> 01:14:12.340
No,

01:14:13.380 --> 01:14:16.280
it was really just kind of the Russian

01:14:16.341 --> 01:14:17.462
internet blocks in general.

01:14:17.622 --> 01:14:18.822
I know when those, well,

01:14:20.863 --> 01:14:22.502
when the war in Ukraine first started,

01:14:22.823 --> 01:14:25.083
I know Russia started cracking down on

01:14:25.104 --> 01:14:25.823
VPNs.

01:14:26.064 --> 01:14:28.704
And at the time I was with Surveillance

01:14:28.725 --> 01:14:30.046
Report and Henry really made a good point

01:14:30.065 --> 01:14:32.166
about how this is one of the drawbacks

01:14:32.286 --> 01:14:34.226
of a centralized app store.

01:14:34.327 --> 01:14:35.567
And at the time we were talking about

01:14:35.646 --> 01:14:35.926
Apple,

01:14:35.966 --> 01:14:37.167
but now it seems like we're starting to

01:14:37.188 --> 01:14:38.087
talk about Android too.

01:14:39.167 --> 01:14:40.088
Um, because, you know,

01:14:40.368 --> 01:14:42.470
with Android and sideloading, uh,

01:14:42.750 --> 01:14:43.951
which I know people don't like that term,

01:14:43.970 --> 01:14:44.270
but you know,

01:14:44.390 --> 01:14:45.952
Android and installing third-party

01:14:45.971 --> 01:14:47.072
installs, whatever you want to call it.

01:14:47.591 --> 01:14:49.092
It's, um,

01:14:49.153 --> 01:14:50.453
it's kind of hard for Android to be

01:14:50.493 --> 01:14:50.734
like, well,

01:14:50.774 --> 01:14:52.734
we blocked VPN installs because they can't

01:14:52.755 --> 01:14:54.775
block VPN installs and Tor installs.

01:14:55.155 --> 01:14:56.356
Whereas Apple, you know, when,

01:14:56.516 --> 01:14:58.158
when Russia came to Apple and was like,

01:14:58.198 --> 01:14:58.398
Hey,

01:14:58.438 --> 01:15:00.519
remove proton VPN and Nord VPN and all

01:15:00.538 --> 01:15:02.539
these VPNs, they had no choice,

01:15:02.560 --> 01:15:04.041
but to be like, all right, we'll do.

01:15:04.220 --> 01:15:06.582
Cause you know that everything's so

01:15:06.641 --> 01:15:08.002
centralized and locked down, but.

01:15:08.823 --> 01:15:11.783
Yeah, with a total internet blackout,

01:15:11.804 --> 01:15:13.944
the thing that comes to mind is years

01:15:13.984 --> 01:15:17.546
ago, again, back on surveillance report.

01:15:17.667 --> 01:15:22.509
So I interviewed John Todd,

01:15:22.729 --> 01:15:24.670
who was the president of Quad Nine,

01:15:24.850 --> 01:15:25.150
I think.

01:15:26.810 --> 01:15:27.572
He's from Quad Nine.

01:15:27.612 --> 01:15:28.511
I think he was the president at the

01:15:28.532 --> 01:15:28.692
time.

01:15:28.712 --> 01:15:29.653
I'm not sure if he's still there.

01:15:29.733 --> 01:15:31.573
But it was interesting because we talked

01:15:31.594 --> 01:15:31.894
about,

01:15:31.913 --> 01:15:35.255
or it briefly came up about censorship

01:15:35.295 --> 01:15:35.695
resistance.

01:15:35.735 --> 01:15:36.876
And something he said that always stuck

01:15:36.895 --> 01:15:38.556
with me is he's not a fan of,

01:15:40.292 --> 01:15:42.993
DNS over HTTPS specifically for stuff like

01:15:43.054 --> 01:15:48.615
this because if if the government starts

01:15:48.655 --> 01:15:51.896
doing mass blocking at a DNS level and

01:15:51.936 --> 01:15:54.118
you use something like DOH it makes your

01:15:54.158 --> 01:15:57.380
traffic just blend in and eventually it

01:15:57.420 --> 01:15:58.060
kind of like

01:16:01.497 --> 01:16:03.219
I'm not trying to use language that is

01:16:03.259 --> 01:16:04.399
sympathetic to a government for the

01:16:04.420 --> 01:16:04.680
record,

01:16:04.739 --> 01:16:06.180
but it kind of backs them into a

01:16:06.240 --> 01:16:08.002
corner where they just decide to shut off

01:16:08.021 --> 01:16:09.444
the internet entirely because they can't

01:16:09.463 --> 01:16:11.845
figure out what traffic is going around

01:16:11.885 --> 01:16:12.466
the censorship.

01:16:12.525 --> 01:16:14.747
And I guess he was really ahead of

01:16:14.787 --> 01:16:16.288
his time with that prediction because

01:16:16.849 --> 01:16:17.989
that's basically what we're looking at

01:16:18.010 --> 01:16:18.329
right now.

01:16:18.390 --> 01:16:18.770
So yes,

01:16:18.850 --> 01:16:21.072
it's a really tricky thing because how

01:16:21.112 --> 01:16:22.733
would you, you know, and especially,

01:16:22.752 --> 01:16:24.173
I don't know,

01:16:24.234 --> 01:16:25.636
I feel like completely disconnecting from

01:16:25.655 --> 01:16:26.936
the global internet is a completely

01:16:26.957 --> 01:16:28.358
different beast that I don't even know how

01:16:28.377 --> 01:16:29.137
we would handle that.

01:16:29.158 --> 01:16:30.118
And I guess at that point it's,

01:16:32.016 --> 01:16:32.176
I mean,

01:16:32.216 --> 01:16:33.216
it's what are you trying to do?

01:16:33.256 --> 01:16:34.457
If you're just trying to talk to people

01:16:34.578 --> 01:16:36.318
locally, then yeah.

01:16:36.337 --> 01:16:37.719
Things like Meshtastic, I think,

01:16:39.698 --> 01:16:40.699
I really want to get into that,

01:16:40.739 --> 01:16:43.180
but it looks like it would require a

01:16:43.220 --> 01:16:44.640
little bit of skill just to kind of

01:16:45.341 --> 01:16:46.561
first time dive in, you know,

01:16:46.601 --> 01:16:48.822
to figure out the hardware and figure out

01:16:48.862 --> 01:16:51.542
the install and the apps and the,

01:16:51.783 --> 01:16:52.963
it feels like a bit of a commitment,

01:16:53.043 --> 01:16:54.823
but if there's maybe a way to make

01:16:54.863 --> 01:16:55.663
those things a little bit more

01:16:55.764 --> 01:16:56.805
user-friendly or...

01:16:59.377 --> 01:16:59.756
I don't know.

01:16:59.817 --> 01:17:00.658
Yeah,

01:17:00.917 --> 01:17:02.417
it's a good question because there's

01:17:02.778 --> 01:17:04.158
different things you would need in that

01:17:04.179 --> 01:17:04.878
situation, right?

01:17:05.679 --> 01:17:06.939
I would need to be able to communicate

01:17:06.960 --> 01:17:08.961
with my family here in the country,

01:17:09.320 --> 01:17:09.940
hypothetically.

01:17:10.541 --> 01:17:13.042
But then I would also need to be

01:17:13.061 --> 01:17:14.983
able to communicate with the wider

01:17:15.042 --> 01:17:16.423
internet and get information,

01:17:16.543 --> 01:17:18.625
which here in the US, unfortunately,

01:17:18.645 --> 01:17:19.824
we are kind of the wider internet.

01:17:19.885 --> 01:17:20.886
But in another country,

01:17:20.926 --> 01:17:21.626
that wouldn't be the case.

01:17:21.666 --> 01:17:22.746
Or I mean, Proton even.

01:17:22.786 --> 01:17:24.087
I wouldn't be able to check my ProtonMail,

01:17:24.127 --> 01:17:24.266
so...

01:17:24.827 --> 01:17:25.046
Yeah.

01:17:25.067 --> 01:17:25.948
I don't know.

01:17:26.007 --> 01:17:26.228
It's crazy.

01:17:26.247 --> 01:17:27.128
And even Meshtastic,

01:17:27.850 --> 01:17:30.452
that puts people in a dangerous situation.

01:17:30.492 --> 01:17:32.193
And there's always the possibility that

01:17:33.293 --> 01:17:35.475
Russia could, I mean,

01:17:35.515 --> 01:17:36.676
both ban the use of it,

01:17:36.716 --> 01:17:38.658
but also ban the import of Meshtastic

01:17:38.698 --> 01:17:39.099
hardware.

01:17:40.239 --> 01:17:41.440
I doubt any of it is being made

01:17:41.621 --> 01:17:43.362
domestically in Russia.

01:17:44.724 --> 01:17:47.426
And if anything is or could be,

01:17:47.786 --> 01:17:49.087
the Russian government could stop that.

01:17:49.747 --> 01:17:50.007
Yeah.

01:17:50.935 --> 01:17:52.237
and also just using it,

01:17:52.337 --> 01:17:53.677
or any sort of radio service,

01:17:53.877 --> 01:17:56.640
you can be trivially tracked.

01:17:56.680 --> 01:17:57.840
It does have a short range,

01:17:58.140 --> 01:17:59.320
so it depends where you are,

01:17:59.341 --> 01:18:01.582
but if people go around from the

01:18:01.622 --> 01:18:03.003
government and try to track people down

01:18:03.024 --> 01:18:06.305
who are using Matchtastic in the future,

01:18:06.326 --> 01:18:07.466
they would pretty much be able to find

01:18:07.506 --> 01:18:07.886
out who's

01:18:08.707 --> 01:18:10.728
using it um so there so there are

01:18:10.768 --> 01:18:13.248
concerns there i mean we even talked about

01:18:13.269 --> 01:18:15.170
in a previous episode um i think it

01:18:15.210 --> 01:18:17.690
was in belarus if i remember correctly um

01:18:18.190 --> 01:18:20.572
ham radio enthusiasts were being accused

01:18:20.671 --> 01:18:23.552
of like um being espionage agents

01:18:23.653 --> 01:18:25.493
basically um for

01:18:26.434 --> 01:18:28.694
for using their own like radio waves to

01:18:28.734 --> 01:18:30.296
communicate rather than like these

01:18:30.315 --> 01:18:31.216
government sanctioned things.

01:18:31.976 --> 01:18:34.359
So it does like any of this amateur

01:18:34.378 --> 01:18:36.300
radio stuff does put you in a dangerous

01:18:36.319 --> 01:18:37.661
position in a country like this.

01:18:38.801 --> 01:18:40.322
And especially if it becomes too

01:18:40.382 --> 01:18:41.023
widespread,

01:18:41.502 --> 01:18:43.423
it's very easy to imagine that Russia

01:18:43.444 --> 01:18:45.485
would take a similar position to the

01:18:45.546 --> 01:18:47.667
Internet in general and just blanket ban

01:18:47.707 --> 01:18:49.247
it because they don't really need it.

01:18:51.288 --> 01:18:52.989
The other reason this can't really be

01:18:53.069 --> 01:18:55.310
solved from like a technical perspective

01:18:55.572 --> 01:18:55.771
is

01:18:57.056 --> 01:18:57.497
Um, like,

01:18:57.518 --> 01:18:59.418
I don't think it's something that another

01:18:59.458 --> 01:19:01.640
country like the United States or someone

01:19:01.701 --> 01:19:04.122
else could kind of reach in and try

01:19:04.162 --> 01:19:06.243
to solve for Russian citizens.

01:19:06.404 --> 01:19:08.444
Like immediately what might come to mind

01:19:08.706 --> 01:19:10.846
is something like Starlink, for example,

01:19:10.907 --> 01:19:12.769
providing direct access to the internet,

01:19:12.788 --> 01:19:14.270
bypassing, you know,

01:19:14.369 --> 01:19:17.212
anything going on in Russia.

01:19:17.351 --> 01:19:18.533
But Starlink,

01:19:18.832 --> 01:19:21.694
like when that technology is in place,

01:19:21.835 --> 01:19:24.277
we see it used for, um,

01:19:25.563 --> 01:19:27.644
a lot of different things that the United

01:19:27.684 --> 01:19:29.505
States and companies like SpaceX

01:19:29.524 --> 01:19:31.365
definitely do not want to promote or

01:19:31.405 --> 01:19:31.765
support.

01:19:31.826 --> 01:19:35.228
We saw in the war with Ukraine,

01:19:35.247 --> 01:19:35.967
for example,

01:19:36.047 --> 01:19:38.369
Russian frontline troops were using

01:19:38.470 --> 01:19:41.371
Starlink extensively to communicate on the

01:19:41.390 --> 01:19:41.952
battlefield.

01:19:41.992 --> 01:19:44.292
That's actually the reason SpaceX

01:19:45.359 --> 01:19:47.661
does not operate in that region at all

01:19:47.720 --> 01:19:48.801
and hasn't for many years.

01:19:49.042 --> 01:19:51.305
And bringing it back for Russian citizens

01:19:51.345 --> 01:19:54.287
to get around something like this would

01:19:54.306 --> 01:19:56.609
just enable that usage of it again,

01:19:58.251 --> 01:19:59.652
which they definitely don't want to do.

01:20:00.092 --> 01:20:04.036
So it puts Russians in not a great

01:20:04.076 --> 01:20:07.819
situation and really the only solution.

01:20:08.668 --> 01:20:09.909
like we say for a lot of these

01:20:09.949 --> 01:20:12.332
very widespread privacy issues,

01:20:12.972 --> 01:20:15.295
whether it's age verification in Western

01:20:15.335 --> 01:20:19.457
countries or mass censorship in other

01:20:19.497 --> 01:20:21.078
countries, like in this case,

01:20:21.979 --> 01:20:24.381
it's more of a social issue that you

01:20:24.442 --> 01:20:26.724
have to resolve within your own country.

01:20:26.743 --> 01:20:28.926
And hopefully people can fight back

01:20:28.966 --> 01:20:29.827
against this there.

01:20:32.132 --> 01:20:32.673
Because, I mean,

01:20:33.054 --> 01:20:34.614
this should not be unacceptable.

01:20:34.875 --> 01:20:37.056
I mean, this should not be acceptable,

01:20:37.898 --> 01:20:38.679
if you know what I mean.

01:20:38.698 --> 01:20:40.780
So, yeah.

01:20:41.381 --> 01:20:41.640
Yeah,

01:20:41.740 --> 01:20:43.962
it's definitely something tricky that I

01:20:44.002 --> 01:20:46.685
don't know if we're qualified to solve.

01:20:46.725 --> 01:20:49.507
But I guess if there's any takeaways on

01:20:49.528 --> 01:20:49.828
this one,

01:20:49.868 --> 01:20:54.212
it would just be kind of a...

01:20:54.231 --> 01:20:55.774
I'm pretty open about having a mild

01:20:55.854 --> 01:20:57.234
interest in disaster prep.

01:20:57.414 --> 01:20:59.457
And sometimes that gets categorized as

01:21:00.167 --> 01:21:02.248
wrongly it gets characterized as like you

01:21:02.269 --> 01:21:03.748
know worrying about the end of the world

01:21:04.088 --> 01:21:06.029
um which i don't care about that but

01:21:06.050 --> 01:21:08.590
you know just little things like floods uh

01:21:08.609 --> 01:21:10.490
hurricanes tornadoes earthquakes and

01:21:11.230 --> 01:21:12.671
unfortunately we are in an incredibly

01:21:12.712 --> 01:21:14.091
digital world so you have to think about

01:21:14.212 --> 01:21:17.972
outages and cyber attacks and so um i

01:21:17.993 --> 01:21:19.453
guess yeah if nothing else this is just

01:21:19.474 --> 01:21:20.474
kind of a thought experiment of

01:21:21.912 --> 01:21:23.613
if you're listening and you're in a

01:21:23.632 --> 01:21:24.833
situation where you don't have to worry

01:21:24.854 --> 01:21:25.435
about this yet,

01:21:26.154 --> 01:21:27.195
just think about it a little bit.

01:21:27.235 --> 01:21:28.497
Like don't lose any sleep over it,

01:21:28.537 --> 01:21:29.177
but you know, what,

01:21:29.238 --> 01:21:30.618
what would I do in that situation?

01:21:30.679 --> 01:21:32.060
And just kind of give that some thought,

01:21:32.100 --> 01:21:32.359
I guess.

01:21:36.493 --> 01:21:39.073
The other forum post we were going to

01:21:39.094 --> 01:21:39.914
look at, this one,

01:21:40.395 --> 01:21:41.676
there's probably not too much to say on

01:21:41.695 --> 01:21:42.895
this one, but there's a new video,

01:21:43.617 --> 01:21:46.137
a YouTuber, this got shared on our forum,

01:21:46.639 --> 01:21:48.078
that said, if you ran this debloater,

01:21:48.139 --> 01:21:49.680
reinstall your system immediately.

01:21:49.880 --> 01:21:51.742
And this is specifically,

01:21:52.622 --> 01:21:54.382
so for the Windows users out there,

01:21:54.462 --> 01:21:58.324
you know that there's a lot of scripts

01:21:58.706 --> 01:22:00.907
that promise to do all kinds of different

01:22:00.947 --> 01:22:02.007
things to your system.

01:22:02.967 --> 01:22:03.548
Um,

01:22:03.569 --> 01:22:04.649
there's a lot of ones that are popular

01:22:04.670 --> 01:22:06.372
in the privacy community that promise to

01:22:06.412 --> 01:22:07.832
remove a lot of telemetry and stuff.

01:22:08.273 --> 01:22:10.274
There's also some that claim to optimize

01:22:10.314 --> 01:22:12.197
the graphics and the performance and this,

01:22:12.216 --> 01:22:12.837
that, and the other,

01:22:13.439 --> 01:22:16.782
there's even entire windows ISOs that, um,

01:22:18.331 --> 01:22:19.431
I want to say it was called Atlas

01:22:19.492 --> 01:22:19.731
OS.

01:22:19.752 --> 01:22:20.532
And if I've got that wrong,

01:22:20.612 --> 01:22:21.653
I apologize to those guys.

01:22:21.693 --> 01:22:23.953
But there was one that advertised itself

01:22:23.993 --> 01:22:25.435
as like a gaming distro.

01:22:25.515 --> 01:22:26.716
And it's basically like you install

01:22:26.735 --> 01:22:28.716
Windows from scratch using this customized

01:22:28.856 --> 01:22:31.898
ISO and it comes pre-optimized for gaming.

01:22:32.399 --> 01:22:35.940
But the downside is it turns off Windows

01:22:35.961 --> 01:22:36.301
Defender.

01:22:37.690 --> 01:22:38.530
which I don't know why you would do

01:22:38.551 --> 01:22:38.711
that.

01:22:39.992 --> 01:22:41.493
So yeah, I'll be honest,

01:22:41.512 --> 01:22:42.733
I didn't watch this specific video,

01:22:42.773 --> 01:22:46.274
but basically it was not trustworthy.

01:22:46.414 --> 01:22:47.855
I think it may have even come with

01:22:47.956 --> 01:22:48.676
actual malware,

01:22:48.695 --> 01:22:49.577
but don't quote me on that.

01:22:50.096 --> 01:22:54.038
And so this whole thread is basically

01:22:54.078 --> 01:22:55.439
talking about these deep loaders and

01:22:55.479 --> 01:22:55.800
stuff.

01:22:56.039 --> 01:22:58.161
And I think the official position of

01:22:58.180 --> 01:22:59.822
Privacy Guides is that we don't recommend

01:22:59.841 --> 01:23:00.542
them because they are...

01:23:02.557 --> 01:23:03.037
They're tricky.

01:23:03.078 --> 01:23:04.579
I know there's some that are open source

01:23:04.819 --> 01:23:06.881
or source available, I should say.

01:23:07.042 --> 01:23:08.524
And if you know code and you're

01:23:08.564 --> 01:23:10.145
comfortable doing it, then sure,

01:23:10.185 --> 01:23:11.528
you could look through it and make sure

01:23:11.728 --> 01:23:13.149
that you verify what it's doing.

01:23:13.210 --> 01:23:14.751
But it's definitely very...

01:23:15.112 --> 01:23:15.993
A lot of these deep loaders,

01:23:16.012 --> 01:23:17.314
you're giving them a lot of power over

01:23:17.333 --> 01:23:18.055
your Windows system.

01:23:18.354 --> 01:23:18.515
And...

01:23:20.077 --> 01:23:20.858
If you're going to use one,

01:23:20.917 --> 01:23:22.298
you have to be like come off of

01:23:22.338 --> 01:23:23.899
a mountain and found a religion positive

01:23:23.920 --> 01:23:26.981
that this thing is trustworthy because it

01:23:27.021 --> 01:23:28.363
would not take much for it to do

01:23:28.422 --> 01:23:29.182
something malicious,

01:23:29.243 --> 01:23:31.184
whether that's planning malware,

01:23:31.264 --> 01:23:33.886
crypto mining, stealing data, whatever.

01:23:33.945 --> 01:23:34.086
So, yeah.

01:23:34.105 --> 01:23:36.408
Absolutely.

01:23:36.488 --> 01:23:37.268
I think I just wanted to take a

01:23:37.307 --> 01:23:38.548
moment to mention that.

01:23:39.369 --> 01:23:41.631
And it's worth noting this tool in

01:23:41.650 --> 01:23:43.452
question is open source as well.

01:23:44.033 --> 01:23:44.632
As far as I know,

01:23:44.653 --> 01:23:45.894
it doesn't come with malware,

01:23:45.934 --> 01:23:46.994
but it basically acts...

01:23:48.307 --> 01:23:49.748
the way that malware would.

01:23:50.409 --> 01:23:52.131
There's a pinned comment on this video

01:23:52.612 --> 01:23:53.912
saying there's a few inaccurate

01:23:53.932 --> 01:23:54.974
statements, but overall,

01:23:57.416 --> 01:24:00.158
the conclusion of the video is that this

01:24:00.179 --> 01:24:01.319
is all implemented poorly.

01:24:01.659 --> 01:24:02.900
I do think this is a classic case

01:24:02.940 --> 01:24:03.320
of like,

01:24:05.109 --> 01:24:06.689
somebody putting something out there

01:24:06.729 --> 01:24:08.431
without really fully understanding what it

01:24:08.452 --> 01:24:08.631
does.

01:24:08.652 --> 01:24:11.595
I don't want to say whether it is

01:24:11.635 --> 01:24:11.875
or not,

01:24:11.895 --> 01:24:13.296
but I think we're just going to see

01:24:14.256 --> 01:24:16.179
this happening more often as more people

01:24:16.198 --> 01:24:18.740
try to AI code tools to solve all

01:24:18.761 --> 01:24:19.881
of their problems without really

01:24:19.921 --> 01:24:21.423
understanding what they are.

01:24:22.364 --> 01:24:23.765
Whether or not that's the case in this

01:24:24.106 --> 01:24:24.686
situation,

01:24:24.747 --> 01:24:26.248
it's definitely something to look out for

01:24:26.288 --> 01:24:29.471
when you're running any sort of scripts

01:24:29.492 --> 01:24:31.113
that you don't fully understand.

01:24:31.154 --> 01:24:32.855
I think that is absolutely the most

01:24:32.916 --> 01:24:33.917
important takeaway here,

01:24:34.277 --> 01:24:37.060
that you cannot run any of these deep

01:24:37.100 --> 01:24:39.342
loading scripts unless you know exactly

01:24:39.363 --> 01:24:40.463
what they do and you see how they're

01:24:40.503 --> 01:24:40.863
doing it,

01:24:40.904 --> 01:24:43.226
because at which point you could probably

01:24:43.266 --> 01:24:44.108
do it yourself, by the way.

01:24:44.547 --> 01:24:48.789
But yeah, all of these scripts like this,

01:24:49.729 --> 01:24:52.591
they affect the system so substantially.

01:24:55.011 --> 01:24:58.853
And Windows is already such a not secure

01:24:58.872 --> 01:25:00.613
and not private platform in the first

01:25:00.654 --> 01:25:01.934
place that it doesn't really make a lot

01:25:01.953 --> 01:25:03.555
of sense to me to try and improve

01:25:03.614 --> 01:25:05.695
it, especially to this degree,

01:25:06.895 --> 01:25:07.716
unfortunately.

01:25:07.895 --> 01:25:09.077
There isn't really a ton...

01:25:11.243 --> 01:25:12.423
that you can do at the end of

01:25:12.444 --> 01:25:14.286
the day to improve your privacy on Windows

01:25:14.326 --> 01:25:16.287
because the operating system itself is

01:25:16.328 --> 01:25:18.890
going to be constantly fighting against

01:25:18.930 --> 01:25:19.150
you.

01:25:21.033 --> 01:25:23.255
So that's unfortunate.

01:25:24.476 --> 01:25:26.658
It's cool to see more videos from this

01:25:26.958 --> 01:25:27.640
YouTuber.

01:25:28.119 --> 01:25:29.402
I first...

01:25:31.158 --> 01:25:33.640
heard about this person who made this

01:25:33.659 --> 01:25:35.282
video calling the other YouTuber who made

01:25:35.322 --> 01:25:37.484
the script out because they made a video

01:25:37.644 --> 01:25:40.065
about Freely around the same time that I

01:25:40.105 --> 01:25:41.226
published a video about Freely.

01:25:41.287 --> 01:25:43.868
So they came up in my feed.

01:25:44.048 --> 01:25:46.912
And I think we had some overlapping

01:25:46.952 --> 01:25:47.431
complaints.

01:25:48.453 --> 01:25:49.314
I haven't watched the rest of their

01:25:49.333 --> 01:25:49.694
videos,

01:25:49.854 --> 01:25:51.796
but I think anybody who is creating

01:25:51.876 --> 01:25:53.377
content in the privacy space

01:25:54.670 --> 01:25:55.530
That's always a good thing.

01:25:56.853 --> 01:25:59.655
And so if they continue to be brought

01:25:59.716 --> 01:26:02.979
up and they continue to post more useful

01:26:03.000 --> 01:26:03.640
content like this,

01:26:05.101 --> 01:26:09.006
I think that's fantastic.

01:26:09.067 --> 01:26:10.228
Yeah, I think about that a lot.

01:26:10.347 --> 01:26:10.608
There's...

01:26:13.180 --> 01:26:14.199
I think there's still plenty of room in

01:26:14.220 --> 01:26:15.640
the privacy space for more voices,

01:26:15.680 --> 01:26:16.020
for sure.

01:26:17.320 --> 01:26:17.921
Yeah, real quick,

01:26:17.940 --> 01:26:19.542
looking through his description on his

01:26:19.561 --> 01:26:21.582
video, you're right.

01:26:21.641 --> 01:26:23.101
It doesn't look like it installs malware,

01:26:23.141 --> 01:26:24.542
but it disables crucial security

01:26:24.582 --> 01:26:26.182
components and makes your system severely

01:26:26.243 --> 01:26:27.222
vulnerable to malware.

01:26:27.283 --> 01:26:29.764
So it also makes your system much more

01:26:29.844 --> 01:26:31.104
unstable and prone to corruption and

01:26:31.123 --> 01:26:31.423
breaking.

01:26:31.524 --> 01:26:32.864
I recommend that anyone who ran this tool

01:26:32.925 --> 01:26:34.444
immediately reinstall a fresh copy of

01:26:34.465 --> 01:26:34.744
Windows.

01:26:34.784 --> 01:26:38.326
So yeah, they're dangerous things.

01:26:39.046 --> 01:26:40.226
You've got to make sure they're trusted if

01:26:40.247 --> 01:26:40.966
you're going to use them at all.

01:26:42.252 --> 01:26:44.052
I also totally hear your argument of like,

01:26:44.073 --> 01:26:47.354
it's already so like such a lost cause

01:26:47.373 --> 01:26:48.494
that it may be safer for a lot

01:26:48.515 --> 01:26:49.975
of people to just not even try and

01:26:49.994 --> 01:26:51.695
just stick to like the,

01:26:51.716 --> 01:26:53.435
the toggles and the settings and stuff.

01:26:53.456 --> 01:26:53.917
So, yeah.

01:26:53.976 --> 01:26:54.777
Yeah.

01:26:56.653 --> 01:26:56.953
Well,

01:26:57.654 --> 01:27:00.095
we've been going for about an hour and

01:27:00.136 --> 01:27:00.876
a half here.

01:27:02.337 --> 01:27:04.257
We'll probably give a last call for any

01:27:04.338 --> 01:27:06.880
questions or comments that people want to

01:27:06.920 --> 01:27:07.761
leave on the forum.

01:27:07.801 --> 01:27:08.862
I don't think we had any on our

01:27:08.902 --> 01:27:10.863
forum post today,

01:27:11.663 --> 01:27:13.145
and I'm not sure if I've seen any

01:27:13.265 --> 01:27:14.466
in the chat here.

01:27:15.686 --> 01:27:17.668
I know there's a bit of a delay

01:27:17.708 --> 01:27:19.109
on this live stream between when I'm

01:27:19.149 --> 01:27:21.432
saying this and when you'll hear it,

01:27:21.493 --> 01:27:23.134
so we'll give people a couple of minutes

01:27:23.274 --> 01:27:24.515
if you want to add anything else.

01:27:24.576 --> 01:27:25.055
Otherwise,

01:27:26.537 --> 01:27:28.500
we'll probably begin to wrap things up.

01:27:28.619 --> 01:27:31.162
So this is your final morning,

01:27:31.302 --> 01:27:34.265
anyone who's watching and wants to chime

01:27:34.286 --> 01:27:35.247
in on any of these stories.

01:27:36.872 --> 01:27:38.154
It's always my favorite part of a live

01:27:38.173 --> 01:27:39.735
stream is knowing that delays there.

01:27:39.996 --> 01:27:41.497
So you say stuff like that, like, Hey,

01:27:41.518 --> 01:27:42.479
we're going to open the floor.

01:27:42.920 --> 01:27:44.242
And now I have to fill time for

01:27:44.282 --> 01:27:45.764
a couple minutes and give people time to

01:27:45.804 --> 01:27:47.426
hear it and write their questions.

01:27:48.648 --> 01:27:51.692
Uh, it just feels so awkward, but, um,

01:27:52.579 --> 01:27:52.760
Yeah,

01:27:52.779 --> 01:27:55.323
apparently we don't have any questions in

01:27:55.363 --> 01:27:56.283
the forum here.

01:27:57.163 --> 01:27:59.947
Got one question from Hogan in the chat

01:27:59.987 --> 01:28:00.146
here.

01:28:00.346 --> 01:28:01.768
There's been a couple of supply chain

01:28:01.787 --> 01:28:02.569
attacks recently.

01:28:02.668 --> 01:28:04.211
The current best practice is to always

01:28:04.270 --> 01:28:04.890
update your apps,

01:28:04.930 --> 01:28:07.353
but this opens you up to those attacks.

01:28:07.394 --> 01:28:08.975
Does it still make sense to keep apps

01:28:09.055 --> 01:28:11.037
updated as recent as possible?

01:28:12.152 --> 01:28:14.332
Definitely depends on the app.

01:28:14.474 --> 01:28:17.916
I know you have definitely seen this more

01:28:17.956 --> 01:28:20.476
prominently in apps that are built with

01:28:20.617 --> 01:28:23.158
NPM, probably a lot of web-based apps.

01:28:23.698 --> 01:28:24.578
But in general,

01:28:24.679 --> 01:28:28.081
I do think it's probably the safer option

01:28:28.121 --> 01:28:33.864
to keep your apps up to date versus

01:28:34.225 --> 01:28:35.926
not updating them because

01:28:38.122 --> 01:28:40.144
Typically,

01:28:40.243 --> 01:28:42.604
all of these updates are going to... Well,

01:28:42.623 --> 01:28:43.283
not all of them,

01:28:43.484 --> 01:28:44.685
because some of them just add features.

01:28:44.725 --> 01:28:46.265
But most updates that you see are going

01:28:46.284 --> 01:28:48.305
to be patching known vulnerabilities or

01:28:48.345 --> 01:28:50.707
vulnerabilities that you already see in

01:28:50.747 --> 01:28:51.287
the wild.

01:28:52.006 --> 01:28:54.167
And so the potential of a new update

01:28:54.188 --> 01:28:55.967
having a zero-day vulnerability that

01:28:55.988 --> 01:28:58.149
hasn't been discovered yet is probably a

01:28:58.208 --> 01:29:02.270
lot lower than the potential of using code

01:29:02.310 --> 01:29:02.470
that

01:29:03.587 --> 01:29:05.927
almost certainly has known vulnerabilities

01:29:05.948 --> 01:29:07.769
that can be exploited.

01:29:08.488 --> 01:29:09.590
So yeah,

01:29:09.710 --> 01:29:12.730
I would definitely recommend keeping apps

01:29:12.770 --> 01:29:13.212
up to date.

01:29:13.532 --> 01:29:15.012
And especially the lower level you go,

01:29:15.052 --> 01:29:16.193
the more important it is.

01:29:16.212 --> 01:29:17.654
Keeping your operating system up to date

01:29:17.713 --> 01:29:18.453
is super important.

01:29:18.993 --> 01:29:21.296
As we saw, I don't know if...

01:29:22.756 --> 01:29:24.117
when we talked about this on the show,

01:29:24.176 --> 01:29:28.220
but recently iOS had a bunch of updates

01:29:28.279 --> 01:29:32.162
for zero-day vulnerabilities in Safari and

01:29:32.242 --> 01:29:33.882
some other security vulnerabilities which

01:29:33.943 --> 01:29:37.685
were not patched at all in the previous

01:29:37.706 --> 01:29:38.706
version of iOS.

01:29:39.447 --> 01:29:41.328
You had to be on iOS to receive

01:29:41.368 --> 01:29:42.548
some of these security updates.

01:29:43.509 --> 01:29:46.170
And so it's examples like that where even

01:29:46.711 --> 01:29:47.831
a company like Apple,

01:29:47.871 --> 01:29:52.012
which is relatively well known to provide

01:29:52.052 --> 01:29:53.993
security patches to older versions of

01:29:54.014 --> 01:29:54.953
their operating system,

01:29:55.094 --> 01:29:59.775
they almost are never doing that super

01:29:59.815 --> 01:30:00.476
consistently.

01:30:00.596 --> 01:30:01.636
And in that case, they weren't.

01:30:02.056 --> 01:30:03.158
And so it's always, I think,

01:30:03.177 --> 01:30:05.019
a danger to not be fully up to

01:30:05.038 --> 01:30:05.238
date.

01:30:06.722 --> 01:30:08.704
It's interesting, kind of related to this,

01:30:08.784 --> 01:30:11.466
I just installed an app on my phone

01:30:11.506 --> 01:30:13.228
and during the setup process it said you

01:30:13.247 --> 01:30:15.509
should disable automatic OS updates

01:30:15.569 --> 01:30:17.609
because they don't validate how it works.

01:30:17.630 --> 01:30:20.292
And I was like, that's terrible advice.

01:30:21.332 --> 01:30:23.493
That was a medical device related app.

01:30:23.573 --> 01:30:27.497
So I think they were saying that because

01:30:27.516 --> 01:30:30.738
they have to validate how OS updates work,

01:30:30.779 --> 01:30:32.340
but it's like that kind of puts all

01:30:32.359 --> 01:30:34.161
of the users of this device in danger.

01:30:34.841 --> 01:30:35.301
So that's...

01:30:36.953 --> 01:30:38.953
yeah sometimes you will definitely see

01:30:39.014 --> 01:30:41.255
software and advice that are at odds with

01:30:41.314 --> 01:30:46.735
security advice but generally um yeah keep

01:30:46.756 --> 01:30:50.435
your stuff up to date yeah i agree

01:30:50.536 --> 01:30:54.716
i think um i hope that i would

01:30:54.737 --> 01:30:57.216
be interested to see an actual study on

01:30:57.797 --> 01:31:00.018
how many like supply chain attacks versus

01:31:00.057 --> 01:31:02.957
how many um like known vulnerability or

01:31:02.978 --> 01:31:05.219
zero days are being patched um i'd be

01:31:05.238 --> 01:31:06.158
willing to bet that

01:31:07.266 --> 01:31:10.630
the supply chain attacks are more rare

01:31:10.671 --> 01:31:11.671
just by raw numbers.

01:31:11.771 --> 01:31:12.412
And, you know, something,

01:31:13.913 --> 01:31:15.916
something I struggle with a lot in all

01:31:15.996 --> 01:31:18.318
areas of life is I forget what the

01:31:18.337 --> 01:31:19.560
name of it is, but, um,

01:31:20.747 --> 01:31:22.448
It's a logical fallacy because news is

01:31:22.488 --> 01:31:24.951
news because it's out of the ordinary,

01:31:25.011 --> 01:31:25.591
right?

01:31:26.431 --> 01:31:27.993
Even the example I like to use is

01:31:28.012 --> 01:31:28.734
traffic accidents.

01:31:28.953 --> 01:31:31.376
Nobody ever goes on... Tonight at five,

01:31:31.756 --> 01:31:33.578
man gets home from office safely without

01:31:33.637 --> 01:31:34.018
incident.

01:31:34.757 --> 01:31:35.599
Nobody talks about that.

01:31:35.939 --> 01:31:37.180
And even traffic,

01:31:37.439 --> 01:31:38.981
accidents are so common that we don't even

01:31:39.021 --> 01:31:40.382
really talk about the accidents that much.

01:31:40.403 --> 01:31:41.663
It's usually just like, hey,

01:31:41.684 --> 01:31:43.364
traffic's bad because there's an accident.

01:31:43.465 --> 01:31:44.305
It's more about the traffic.

01:31:44.365 --> 01:31:44.506
But

01:31:45.667 --> 01:31:48.350
News is news because it's unusual.

01:31:48.390 --> 01:31:50.993
So when we see all these supply chain

01:31:51.012 --> 01:31:53.275
attacks, it's because, I'm guessing,

01:31:53.336 --> 01:31:56.819
they're still the exception instead of the

01:31:56.859 --> 01:31:57.180
norm.

01:31:57.261 --> 01:31:59.583
But that said, I hope...

01:32:01.177 --> 01:32:02.099
kind of a dark way to look at

01:32:02.139 --> 01:32:02.519
it, but I,

01:32:02.658 --> 01:32:04.979
I hope we're seeing enough of them that,

01:32:05.301 --> 01:32:05.640
um,

01:32:05.680 --> 01:32:06.981
companies are starting to wake up and

01:32:07.021 --> 01:32:08.722
realize the importance of securing their

01:32:08.743 --> 01:32:10.243
supply chain, whatever that may look like.

01:32:11.064 --> 01:32:11.484
Um,

01:32:11.623 --> 01:32:13.045
and hopefully we will start to see those

01:32:13.085 --> 01:32:15.606
go down because if they do become too

01:32:15.627 --> 01:32:15.987
common,

01:32:16.087 --> 01:32:17.387
it becomes a problem for the companies

01:32:17.408 --> 01:32:17.627
too.

01:32:17.648 --> 01:32:18.087
Cause think about it.

01:32:18.108 --> 01:32:18.448
That's money.

01:32:18.469 --> 01:32:21.109
They have to spend a, um, regain control,

01:32:21.170 --> 01:32:22.070
kick out the person,

01:32:22.150 --> 01:32:24.051
try to push out the good code to

01:32:24.091 --> 01:32:25.113
fix the bad code.

01:32:25.752 --> 01:32:27.333
Um, the reputational damage,

01:32:27.373 --> 01:32:28.335
like all of that stuff.

01:32:28.375 --> 01:32:28.555
So,

01:32:29.588 --> 01:32:30.408
It affects them too.

01:32:30.550 --> 01:32:31.510
I don't know if we're at that point

01:32:31.529 --> 01:32:33.270
yet, but... Absolutely.

01:32:33.411 --> 01:32:33.631
I mean,

01:32:33.671 --> 01:32:36.252
to take it to the most extreme example,

01:32:36.332 --> 01:32:36.572
right?

01:32:36.931 --> 01:32:37.192
Like,

01:32:37.893 --> 01:32:40.974
you never would ever see a news article

01:32:41.014 --> 01:32:43.895
today about a new vulnerability in Windows

01:32:44.055 --> 01:32:45.275
XP or something like that.

01:32:45.315 --> 01:32:46.756
But everyone knows you can't be using

01:32:46.796 --> 01:32:51.337
Windows XP on the open internet because

01:32:51.377 --> 01:32:54.139
it's just so insanely vulnerable to all of

01:32:54.158 --> 01:32:54.699
these attacks.

01:32:54.779 --> 01:32:55.500
But, like...

01:32:57.612 --> 01:32:59.073
We already know you shouldn't be using it.

01:32:59.113 --> 01:33:00.474
So if a new attack is discovered,

01:33:00.515 --> 01:33:01.916
that's not going to make the news.

01:33:01.956 --> 01:33:03.296
And that's going to be the case for,

01:33:03.337 --> 01:33:03.556
I think,

01:33:03.596 --> 01:33:05.658
a lot of apps that you don't keep

01:33:05.698 --> 01:33:07.921
up to date, which is why, in general,

01:33:07.961 --> 01:33:09.881
I would still say the updates are super

01:33:09.902 --> 01:33:10.443
important.

01:33:15.306 --> 01:33:16.847
Yep.

01:33:16.948 --> 01:33:18.809
All right.

01:33:18.868 --> 01:33:20.551
I guess that's all we got this week.

01:33:27.070 --> 01:33:27.832
Okay.

01:33:28.393 --> 01:33:28.573
All right.

01:33:30.115 --> 01:33:32.679
Well, I think, yeah, we can, I'll just,

01:33:33.140 --> 01:33:35.462
I'm going to give the form thread one

01:33:35.483 --> 01:33:36.545
more check unless you just did,

01:33:37.024 --> 01:33:38.027
but it looks like there's nothing else.

01:33:38.046 --> 01:33:38.146
Yeah,

01:33:38.167 --> 01:33:39.509
I've got it open on another window here.

01:33:39.828 --> 01:33:40.050
Cool.

01:33:40.551 --> 01:33:43.972
Okay, well, thanks everyone for tuning in.

01:33:44.993 --> 01:33:45.634
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